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ARTICLES
Age Discrimination and Disparate
Impact

A NEW LOOK AT AN AGE-OLD PROBLEM*

Kenneth R. Davis'
1.

INTRODUCTION

America is aging. As the generation of baby boomers
approaches its fifties and sixties, it occupies every venue in the
American workforce from the assembly line to the corporate
boardroom. Baby boomers hold government posts from postal
clerk to the presidency. They are teachers and administrators,
stockbrokers and real estate salespersons. They work in steel
mills and textile factories, run retail shops, and manage
sprawling business enterprises. Today, about 51% of the labor
force is over forty.1 The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that
this number will rise to 53% by 2012.2

© 2004 Kenneth R. Davis. All Rights Reserved.
t Associate Professor, Fordham University Graduate School of Business
Administration. B.A., SUNY at Binghamton, 1969; M.A., California State University at
Long Beach, 1971; J.D., University of Toledo, 1977. My thanks to Jeffrey Franco for his
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1 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Total Labor Force, at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/
special.requests/ep/labor.force/clfa02l2.txt (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
2 Id.
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Older workers have long endured unfair stereotypes of
waning competence.3 Misguided employers deny jobs to such
workers under the false assumption that graying hair and a
sixtieth birthday signal a decline in productivity.' To combat
these stereotypes, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). 5 Enacted in 1967, the ADEA forbids
discrimination against workers over the age of forty
Disparate impact theory makes facially neutral
if
they
have
a
practices
unlawful
employment
7
disproportionately adverse impact on a protected class. This
theory outlaws unintentional discrimination unless the
employer shows that business necessity justifies the challenged
To show business necessity, the
employment practice
employer ordinarily links the challenged employment practice
to job performance For example, requiring prison guards to
have a minimum height of 5 feet 2 inches and a minimum
weight of 120 pounds would have a disproportionate impact on
women. Such requirements would be legally permissible only if
the prison authority could show that they are performance
related."0

3 Congress has found that:

(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and
especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs; (2) the setting of
arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job performance has become a
common practice, and certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the
disadvantage of older persons; (3) the incidence of unemployment, especially
long-term unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and
employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among older
workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their employment
problems grave.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621(a)(1)-(3) (2000).
4 DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965) reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 8 (1981) [hereinafter LABOR REPORT]
(finding that "[tlhe competence and work performance of older workers are, by any
general measures, at least equal to those of younger workers.").
6 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624 (2000)).
6

Id.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (establishing disparate
impact liability in racial discrimination cases brought under Title VII).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 This issue was presented in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
7

Adopted by Alabama statute, these requirements had a disproportionate impact on
women, and the Alabama Department of Corrections failed to justify these
requirements by showing that they enhanced job performance. Id. at 331.
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Applicable to all federally protected classes under Title
VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)," disparate
impact law prohibits discrimination because of race, sex,
religion, national origin, 2 and disability. 3 Because of a unique
provision in the ADEA," the federal courts, over the past four
decades, have split over whether disparate impact theory
applies to age discrimination. 5 The Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in Smith v. City of Jackson" to resolve this
conflict." Because so many millions now populate the class of
workers forty and older, the answer to this issue will carry
enormous economic and social consequences.18
Part II of this Article discusses disparate impact theory,
first recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' The discussion of
Griggs will focus on the elements of a disparate impact claim,
the business necessity defense, and the policy underpinnings of
1 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213 (2000)).
1
Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this title only if a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent
uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
13 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) codifies disparate
impact law
as defined in Griggs, and applies disparate impact protection to the disabled. The ADA
provides that an employer engages in an unlawful discriminatory practice by:
[Uftilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the
effect of discrimination on the basis of disability, [and] using qualification
standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or
tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals
with disabilities unless the standard, test, or other selection criteria, as used
by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question
and is consistent with business necessity.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(3)(A), (b)(6) (2000).
14 See infra Part
IV.A.2.
" See infra note 68 and accompanying text (citing cases that have expressed
positions on the issue).
16 Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, 72
U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2004) (No. 03-1160).
1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Adams v. Florida Power Corp.,
534 U.S. 1054 (2001), to decide whether disparate impact analysis applies to age
discrimination cases, but the court subsequently dismissed the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted, 535 U.S. 228 (2002).
16 Appellants stressed in their petition for a writ of certiorari that "[ailmost
seventy million employees age forty and over - nearly half of the civilian labor force are protected by the ADEA. Because the Act covers so many employees, the question
presented is of great importance to the national economy." Smith v. City of Jackson,
No. 03-1160, 2004 WL 304286, at *9 (Feb. 11, 2004) (citations omitted).
19 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
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the decision. After presenting post-Griggs approaches to
defining business necessity, this Part will end with an
explanation of the "less discriminatory alternative" test.
Part III examines the majority and dissenting opinions
of Smith v. City of Jackson," the Fifth Circuit case now pending
before the U.S. Supreme Court. In Smith, the Court will
determine whether disparate impact theory applies to age
discrimination.2 An examination of the Fifth Circuit's opinion
and the dissenting opinion offer a springboard for
understanding the arguments on both sides of the issue.
Part IV analyzes the legal arguments both for and
against the application of disparate impact theory to the
ADEA. This Part focuses on the text of the ADEA, emphasizing
'the "reasonable factors other than age" (RFOA) defense.
Having criticized alternative interpretations of that provision,
Part IV determines that the RFOA defense applies to cases of
disparate treatment rather than disparate impact. After
analyzing the legislative history of the ADEA, this Part
dissects the language of Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins," looking
for clues of how the Supreme Court will likely rule in Smith.
This Part then discusses Congress' failure to amend the ADEA
to include disparate impact claims, and concludes that none of
the numerous legal arguments indicates a clear resolution to
the issue.
Part V explores policy issues arising out of the extension
of disparate impact coverage to the class of workers over forty.
First, this Part argues that extending disparate impact theory
to age cases would not promote the theory's purposes. This Part
then identifies African-Americans as a preferred protected
class, and shows the effects that providing workers over forty
with disparate impact coverage would have on AfricanAmericans. Workers over forty comprise a majority of the
workforce and they hold a significant number of high-paying,
managerial jobs. African-Americans are underrepresented
among this class of workers. Therefore, an unintended
consequence of providing older workers with disparate impact
coverage would be to freeze African-Americans out of jobs that
employers have historically denied them. The Article concludes
20

351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003).

21 Jackson Lewis, Employment-Related Supreme Court Decisions: The Year in

Review and What's Ahead (Oct. 5, 2004), at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legal updates/article.cfm?aid=640 (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
22 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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that, as a matter of policy, disparate impact protection should
not be extended to workers covered by the ADEA.
II.

THE ORIGINS AND CONTOURS OF DISPARATE IMPACT LAW

To determine whether the theory of disparate impact
should apply to age discrimination, one must understand the
origins and contours of disparate impact law. In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., the Supreme Court established disparate impact as
a basis for recovery under Title VII.
A.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
1. The Facts and Procedural Background

Duke Power Company organized its Dan River plant
into five operating departments, including the relatively low
paying Labor and Coal Handling departments to the more
lucrative
"inside" departments
including,
Operations,
2
Maintenance and Laboratory and Test. The controversy in the
case arose from screening practices that Duke instituted for
entry-level hires and transfers to inside positions. First, Duke
initiated a policy requiring a high school diploma for initial
assignment to any department except Labor.25 Second, Duke
established the requirement that incumbent workers attain
certain minimum scores on two professionally prepared
aptitude tests before qualifying for transfer." These screening
requirements disqualified a disproportionately high number of
African-Americans from hire and for promotion. 7 Black
employees at the Dan River plant commenced a class action
against Duke." The facts counseled both for and against
liability. On the one hand, Duke's failure to link the screening
401 U.S. 424 (1971).

Id. at 427.
Id. According to the 1960 census, 34% of white males nationwide earned
high school diplomas, whereas only 12% of black males earned such diplomas. Id. at
430.
26 Id. at 427-28. Duke required incumbent employees seeking transfer
to
inside positions to take the Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett Mechanical
Comprehension Test. Id. at 428. To pass and to be eligible for transfer, an employee
had to score approximately at the national median for high school graduates. Id. Thus,
the standard adopted by Duke would have eliminated approximately one-half of all
high school graduates from consideration for transfer. Id. at 428 n.3.
27 See id. at
429.
28 See Griggs, 404 U.S. at 426.
24

25
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requirements to job performance supported the employees'
claims.' However, the absence of evidence of discriminatory
intent bolstered Duke's position that it had not violated Title
VII. ° The Fourth Circuit agreed with Duke, holding that
discriminatory intent is a necessary element of a Title VII
violation."
2. The Reasoning of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the absence of
discriminatory intent does not necessarily insulate a defendant
from liability under Title VII. 2 Although noting that Title VII
does not guarantee jobs to victims of prior discrimination or to
racial minorities, the Court stressed that Title VII does
promise equality of employment opportunity.' To achieve this
objective, Title VII seeks to remove barriers that "freeze" black
workers into the status quo created by a history of employment
discrimination.' The Court observed that blacks do not on
average receive the same high-quality education as whites."
Thus, Duke's diploma and test requirements, even if not
intentional instruments of discrimination, perpetuated a
pattern of minority exclusion from the workplace."6
practices
that
employment
Court
held
The
discriminatory in operation violate Title VII." Though Title VII
certainly condemns discriminatory motives, it also prohibits
the discriminatory consequences of employment practices, even
if the consequences are unintentional." A facially neutral
employment practice that has a disproportionately adverse
impact on minorities is a prima facie violation of Title VII." If,
however, the employer can justify the employment practice as a
29 See id. at 429
n.5.
"0

See id. at 429.

" See id. at 428.
32 See id. at 431, 432. The Court commended Duke for having undertaken
a

program to contribute two-thirds of the cost of tuition for those undereducated
employees who sought a high school education. See id. at 432. Laudable motives,
however, did not shelter Duke from liability because liability was predicated upon the
consequences of Duke's practices. See id.
"Griggs, 404 U.S. at 429-31.
3

Id. at 430.

" Id. at 430.
36 See id. at 430-31.

" See id. at 431.
38 Griggs, 404 U.S. at 432.
39

Id.
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business necessity, the challenged practice is permissible.' The
Court defined "business necessity" as job-performance
relatedness."
To meet this test, the job "requirement must
have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."2
In holding against Duke, the Court pointed out that Duke had
offered no evidence linking the diploma or testing requirements
to job performance.3 Equally damning to Duke's jobrelatedness defense, employees hired or transferred before
Duke
implemented
these
requirements
performed
satisfactorily.4 4 Accordingly, Duke had failed to prove that the
tests and diploma requirement bore a "demonstrable
relationship to successful bjob] performance."5
B.

DisparateImpact Law After Griggs

Two questions arise from Griggs' adoption of the
business necessity defense. The first asks how "necessary" a
business necessity must be, and the second asks what proof a
defendant must present to establish the defense. Since Griggs,
the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in answering both
questions. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,4' women challenged
statutory height and weight requirements for prison guards in
the Alabama penal system on the ground that these
requirements disproportionately affected women.47 The Board of
40

See id. at 431. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660

(1989), the Supreme Court shifted the burden of proving business necessity to the
plaintiff. In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, a disgruntled Congress promptly shifted this
burden of proof back to the defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
41 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. Such a justification
often requires complex
statistical proof. While age and sex discrimination cases involve dichotomous classes,
age discrimination cases involve a class distributed along a continuum. Douglas C.
Herbert & Lani S. Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument Against Applying the Disparate
Impact Model in Age DiscriminationCases, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 655-56 (1996). The
complexity of the statistical evidence in age cases will therefore expand to daunting
proportions unsuitable for lay jurors. See id.
42

Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.

Id. at 431.
" Id. at 431-32. Duke also argued that § 703(h) permitted its use of the
Wonderlic and Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Tests. Id. at 433. That subsection
authorizes the use of "any professionally developed ability test" that is not "designed,
intended, or used to discriminate because of race.... ." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)). After reviewing the
legislative history of the subsection, the Court concluded that an employer may not use
a professionally developed test to discriminate, a prohibition which requires a
connection between the test and job performance. Id. at 433-36.
43

45
46
47

Id. at 431.
433 U.S. 321 (1977).

Id. at 328-29.
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Corrections asserted a business necessity defense, arguing that
the requirements correlated with strength, a critical attribute
for prison guards. ' The Court rejected this argument because
the Board of Corrections presented "no evidence correlating the
height and weight requirements with the requisite amount of
strength thought essential to good job performance. " " Thus,
Dothard seemed to favor stringent standards for both the
question of how to define business necessity and the question of
what evidence a plaintiff must present to prove the defense.
First, it expressed a near literal definition of business
necessity; that is, the requirement must be "essential," not
merely conducive, to performing the job. Second, Dothard
seemed to require statistical rather than anecdotal evidence.
Only two years after Dothard, the Supreme Court
articulated a more flexible definition of business necessity and
a more lax evidentiary standard. In New York Transit Auth. v.
Beazer,' the Transit Authority adopted a policy of excluding
participants in methadone programs from all jobs, even those
that were not safety-related." The Court, without statistical
verification, approved the policy, which disproportionately
excluded blacks, satisfied that the policy had a "manifest
relationship to the employment in question."52 Insofar as nonsafety related jobs were concerned, this policy appeared to have
been one of preference rather than necessity.
A more balanced approach to business necessity appears
in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,n in which the Court
stated, "A mere insubstantial justification in this regard will
not suffice . . . . At the same time, though, there is no
48

Id. at 331.

49 Id.

440 U.S. 568 (1979).
51 Id. at 568.
50

r2 Id. at 587 n.31 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971)).

490 U.S. 642 (1989). In Wards Cove, minority workers, primarily Filipinos,
alleged disparate impact claims against two salmon canneries for their hiring and
promotion practices. Id. at 647-48. The plaintiffs argued that the canneries excluded
them from skilled positions, which went primarily to white workers. Id. To establish a
prima facie disparate impact case, the plaintiffs relied on statistics showing the high
percentage of non-white workers in unskilled jobs and the high percentage of white
workers in skilled jobs. Id. at 650. The Court ruled that this statistical showing failed
to establish a prima facie case because it did not take into account the pool of qualified
applicants or the pool of qualified workers in the labor force. Id. at 651. See supra note
40 and accompanying text (discussing congressional reaction to that part of the Wards
Cove decision shifting the burden of persuasion to disprove business necessity to the
plaintiff).
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requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or
'indispensable' to the employer's business ...."
Congress had the opportunity to clarify the standard in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Act, however, equivocates by
providing that the defendant has an affirmative defense to a
claim of disparate impact if he can "demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position and
consistent with business necessity."5 5 By separating job
relatedness and business necessity into two requirements,
Congress has confused the standard.
Case law added another dimension to disparate impact
analysis. Even if the employer meets the business necessity
defense, the challenged practice is nevertheless unlawful if the
plaintiff proves that a less discriminatory alternative
employment practice satisfies the employer's legitimate
business needs, and the employer refuses to adopt the
practice." The Supreme Court created the less discriminatory
alternative test in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 7 holding that
a plaintiff in a disparate impact case will prevail if he can
"show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's
and
trustworthy
'efficient
in
interest
legitimate
5
this
of
1991
codified
workmanship.' . The Civil Rights Act
9
doctrine.
The legal principles governing disparate impact
analysis, along with the doctrine's policy justifications, provide
the background to decide whether disparate impact theory
should apply in age discrimination cases. The remainder of this
article will tackle this issue.

Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
6542 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000) (emphasis added).
6 See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988)
(reaffirming the principle that the plaintiff may prevail by proving a less
discriminatory alternative meeting the employer's legitimate interests, and explaining
that "the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are relevant in
determining whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged practice").
67

422 U.S. 405 (1975).

5

Id. at 425.

59 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
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After years of uncertainty and division among the
circuit courts, the Supreme Court will decide, in Smith v. City
of Jackson,' whether disparate impact analysis applies to the
ADEA.
A.

Smith v. City of Jackson

Chief Judge King, writing for a majority of the Fifth
Circuit, presented a thorough analysis of the arguments
against the applicability of disparate impact theory to the
ADEA. Judge Stewart, in a dissenting opinion, offered a pointby-point critique of the majority's arguments.'
1. Facts and Procedural Background
The City of Jackson police department instituted a
performance pay plan, which granted proportionately higher
raises to officers and dispatchers with five or fewer years of
tenure than those with more than five years of tenure. 2 This
plan resulted in higher raises for officers and dispatchers
under forty compared to the raises received by their coworkers
over forty.' Thirty police officers and dispatchers, all over the
age of forty, brought an ADEA suit against the City of Jackson
and the Jackson police department alleging that the
performance payment plan evidenced both disparate
treatment, that is, intentional discrimination,' and disparate
Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72
U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2004) (No. 03-1160).
61 Id. at 198-203 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
62 id. at 185.

Id. Four standard deviations separated the raises the workers under forty
received from the raises the workers over forty received. Id. at 186.
Intentional discrimination is classified into individual and systemic
disparate treatment. Individual disparate treatment cases are analyzed under two
alternative approaches. The first of these is the three-step, burden-shifting approach of
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This method affords the plaintiff the
opportunity to prove discrimination inferentially by proving that the defendant's
alleged justification for the challenged action was a pretext for discrimination. The first
step of this regime requires the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case by a preponderance
of evidence. In a refusal-to-hire case, for example, the plaintiff must prove: (i) he is a
member of a protected class, (ii) he was qualified for and applied for the job in question,
(iii) he was rejected, and (iv) the employer continued to seek applicants with
qualifications similar to the plaintiff. Id. at 802. At step two, the defendant must
merely articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, id.,
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impact.r The district court granted the defendants summary
judgment on both the disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims.'
The threshold issue in the case was whether disparate
impact theory is even cognizable under the ADEA. On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit held that disparate impact theory does not
apply to age discrimination.

and at step three the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant's articulated step-two reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. In St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) and Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000), the Court, though claiming to be
reaffirming McDonnell Douglas, modified it by holding that plaintiffs disproof of the
step-two reason permits but does not compel judgment for the plaintiff. See Kenneth R.
Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burdening-Shifting Approach in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 761 (1995) (criticizing the McDonnell

Douglas approach and calling for its abandonment). But see Tristan K. Green, Making
Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proofof
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CAL. L. REV. 983, 1011 (1999) (advocating

McDonnell Douglas as the universal framework to resolve individual disparate
treatment cases). The second approach to individual disparate treatment is prescribed
in § 703(m) of Title VII. This approach requires the plaintiff to prove that
discrimination was a "motivating factor for any employment practice." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(m) (2000). If, however, the defendant proves that it "would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible factor" plaintiffs remedies are limited
to declaratory relief, some forms of injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000). Because of confusion among the circuit courts as to
whether the motivating factor test applied only in direct evidence cases, the Supreme
Court decided Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-101 (2003), holding that the
motivating factor test of § 703(m) applies in any individual, disparate treatment case,
whether based on circumstantial or direct evidence. Before Costa, most of the circuit
courts had held that circumstantial evidence cases were within the exclusive domain of
the McDonnell Douglas approach. Costa has therefore cast doubt on the continued
vitality of McDonnell Douglas. See Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing:Refining the Price
Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. L. REV.

859, 888-90 (2004) (arguing that after Costa, the McDonnell Douglas approach serves
no useful purpose). There are two separate types of systemic disparate treatment cases.
The first challenges a systemic pattern and practice of intentional discrimination. See,
e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 312-13 (1977) (remanding
case to district court to determine the appropriate statistical comparisons needed to
assess allegations that Hazelwood was engaged in intentional discrimination by using
subjective hiring criteria to deny teaching jobs to qualified black applicants). The other
type of systematic disparate treatment case, unlike Hazelwood, attacks a formal
discriminatory policy that the employer argues is a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ). See, e.g., Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206-07
(1991) (holding that a fetal protection policy precluding some women from certain
factory jobs was not a BFOQ and therefore violated Title VII).
6
Smith, 351 F.3d at 184-85.
66 Id. at 185. The circuit court vacated the grant
of summary judgment
dismissing the disparate treatment claims and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Id. at 198. The court held that the district court had decided the summary
judgment motion prematurely because discovery motions were pending, Id.
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2. The Reasoning of the Fifth Circuit
The court pointed out that, although disparate impact is
recognized as a theory of recovery under Title VII, the
application of disparate impact theory to the ADEA is
unsettled. 7 Highlighting this uncertainty by surveying circuit
court decisions,' the Fifth Circuit quoted the U.S. Supreme
67 Id. at 186 n.1.

Id. at 187. The predominant position among the circuit and district courts
disallows such claims as a matter of law. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322,
1326 (11th Cir. 2001) (expressly following the reasoning of the First Circuit in Mullin
and the Tenth Circuit in Ellis); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701-04 (1st Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999) (concluding that the ADEA does not permit
disparate impact claims, based on an analysis of Hazen Paper, the text of the ADEA
including the RFOA defense, the legislative history, the absence of the effects of past
discrimination on older workers, and Congress' failure to insert an express disparate
impact provision in the ADEA when it did so in Title VII); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc.,
73 F.3d 999, 1007-09 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that ADEA plaintiffs may not bring
disparate impact claims, and discussing essentially the same reasons as examined in
Mullin); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-78 (7th Cir. 1994)
(ruling that the ADEA does not allow disparate impact claims because of Hazen Paper,
the RFOA defense, and the ADEA's failure to protect "applicants for employment"
compared to Title VII's inclusion of such language); Stone v. First Union Corp., 203
F.R.D. 532, 547 n.18 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding without analysis that disparate impact
claims may not be brought under the ADEA); Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 959 F.
Supp. 742, 746-47 (E.D. Va. 1997) (relying principally on Hazen Paper to hold that the
ADEA does not cover disparate impact claims); Hyman v. First Union Corp., 980 F.
Supp. 38, 42 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting Griggs' failure to cite a statutory basis for its
holding, and therefore rejecting the argument that the similarity of language between
Title VII and the ADEA supports the proposition that the ADEA incorporates disparate
impact claims); Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1435-36 (D. Wyo.
1994) (holding disparate impact theory unavailable under the ADEA because, unlike
racial minorities, older workers have not suffered a history of discrimination and
because age sometimes does correlate with job performance). Some circuit court
decisions question whether disparate impact analysis in age discrimination cases
survives Hazen Paper. See, e.g., Allen v. Entergy Corp., 193 F.3d 1010, 1015 & n.5 (8th
Cir. 1999) (affirming jury verdict against plaintiffs bringing age-based disparate
impact claims, but questioning the efficacy of disparate-impact age-discrimination
claims after Hazen Paper); Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n and Prof] Staff Union, 53 F.3d
135, 139-40 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1995) (doubting whether the ADEA permits disparate
impact claims in light of Hazen Paper'semphasis on the congressional intent to prevent
inaccurate and damaging stereotypes from injuring older workers, but nevertheless
adhering to previous case law of the circuit stating that such claims "may be possible");
DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-35 (3d Cir. 1995) (granting
summary judgment to a defendant on an age-based disparate impact claim, and stating
that "it is difficult to see how disparate impact analysis can survive the analysis [of
Hazen Paper]."). A minority of federal circuit courts has held that the ADEA permits
disparate impact claims. See, e.g., Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56,
69-71 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument that Hazen Paper disallows age-based
disparate impact claims); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1291 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that "[wihen challenging an adverse employment action under the
ADEA, an employee may proceed under two theories of liability: disparate treatment or
disparate impact."); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2000)
(disagreeing that Hazen Paper precludes age-based claims of disparate impact, and
reaffirming "that a disparate impact claim is cognizable in an ADEA case."); Smith v.
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Court, which declared in Hazen Paper v. Biggins: "[W]e have
never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is
available under the ADEA, and we need not do so here. ""
Since disparate impact theory applies under Title VII,
the court began its analysis by comparing the language of the
ADEA to the language of Title VII. 71 Title VII prohibits
discrimination "because of an individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."72 Derived in haec verba from Title VII,
Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1999) (analyzing age-based disparate impact
claim, and affirming summary judgment for the defendant based on the plaintiffs'
inadequate statistical support); Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th
Cir. 1996) (recognizing disparate impact claims under the ADEA post-Hazen Paper). In
Kroger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the D.C. Circuit Court assumed
without deciding that disparate impact analysis applies to age discrimination claims.
69 507 U.S. 604 (1993). In Markham v. Geller, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), an age discrimination
case raising a disparate impact claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist challenged the
applicability of disparate impact analysis to the ADEA as well as the reasoning of the
Second Circuit. The Chief Justice stated in an opinion dissenting from the refusal to
grant a writ of certiorari:
This Court has never held that proof of discriminatory impact can establish a
violation of the ADEA ....

Congress revealed this intention in 29 U.S.C. §

623(f)(1) which provides that it shall not be unlawful for an employer to take
any action otherwise prohibited "where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." Because the differential based on experience
in petitioners' sixth-step policy has nothing to do with age, I would grant the
petition for a writ of certiorari and give plenary consideration to the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
Id. at 948-49 (internal citations omitted).
70 Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Hazen
Paper, 507 U.S. at 610) (internal citation omitted)). Justice O'Connor, writing for the
Hazen Paper Court, made statements that some commentators cite to show the
Supreme Court's likely refusal to recognize disparate impact claims under the ADEA.
She stated, "Disparate treatment, thus defined, captures the essence of what Congress
sought to prohibit in the ADEA." Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610. She also remarked,
"[wihen the employer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age, the
problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears." Id. at 611. See, e.g.,
Miles F. Archer, Mullin v. Raytheon Company: The Threatened Vitality of Disparate

Impact Under the ADEA, 52 ME. L. REV. 150, 161-62 (2000) (suggesting that Hazen
Paper casts doubt on the viability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA). These
statements, however, may not indicate the Court's predilections on this issue. See infra
notes 195-200 and accompanying text (finding alternative interpretations of Justice
O'Connor's remarks).
71 Hazen Paper, 351 F.3d at 188.
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000). The prohibitory subsections of Title
VII provide that it is illegal for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
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the analogous language of the ADEA similarly forbids
discrimination "because of [an] individual's age."73 This
congruence of language had led some courts to hold disparate
impact theory available under the ADEA." The Fifth Circuit,
however, considered another ADEA section that arguably
distinguishes the protective range of the ADEA from the
protective range of Title VII. Unlike Title VII, § 623(f)(1) of the
ADEA provides employers with a defense if the adverse
employment action "is based on reasonable factors other than
age."75 Disparate impact theory prohibits discrimination based
on facially neutral factors - that is, factors other than the
protected trait.' Thus, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that by
eliminating liability based on "reasonable factors other than
age," the ADEA precludes disparate impact liability.77 To
strengthen this conclusion, the court compared the "reasonable
factors other than age" (RFOA) defense to a similar provision
in the Equal Pay Act.7" The Equal Pay Act forbids
discrimination in pay based on sex except under certain
circumstances." One exception permits a pay "differential
based on any other factor other than sex."' In County of
Washington v. Gunther," the Supreme Court stated, in dicta,
Id.
13

Smith, 351 F.2d at 188. See also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (2000). The

prohibitory subsections of the ADEA make it illegal for an employer:
(1) to fail or to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; (2)
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age..
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2). The Fifth Circuit observed that the only other difference
between the language of Title VII and the language of the ADEA, aside from the basis
for protection, is that Title VII extends protection to "applicants" whereas the ADEA
does not. Smith, 351 F.3d at 188.
" Smith, 351 F.3d at 188. See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032
(2d Cir. 1980) (noting that prohibitory provisions of the ADEA were derived in haec
verba from those of Title VII, and relying on this fact to recognize disparate impact
claims in the ADEA).
75 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
16 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
645-46 (1989) (noting
that under disparate impact theory "a facially neutral employment practice may be
deemed violative of Title VII without evidence of the employer's subjective intent to
discriminate").
Smith, 351 F.3d at 190.
7' Id. at 191.
79 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000).
' Smith, 351 F.3d at 191 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)).
81 452 U.S. 161
(1981).
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that this exception forecloses disparate impact protection under
the Equal Pay Act. 2 Though analogizing the RFOA defense to
the similar provision of the Equal Pay Act, the Fifth Circuit
conceded that the two provisions differ: the ADEA permits
"reasonable" factors, in contrast to the Equal Pay Act, which
permits "any" factor.' Nevertheless, the court found no
meaningful distinction between the two provisions, concluding
that the RFOA provision, like the analogous Equal Pay Act
provision, disallows disparate impact claims.
Relying on legislative history, the majority stressed
policy differences between Title VII and the ADEA to
demonstrate why disparate impact theory should not apply to
age discrimination.' To make its point, the court analyzed a
1965 report ("Labor Report") submitted by Willard Wirtz, the
Secretary of Labor, to Congress.' The Labor Report contrasted
the purposes of Title VII with the proposed purposes of the
pending legislation destined to become the ADEA 7 Age
discrimination, the Labor Report noted, arises from
misconceptions about the capabilities of older workers.' It does
not, however, spring from dislike or intolerance.89 This form of
prejudice is not as pernicious as racial bigotry, which stems
from animosity toward racial minorities, particularly AfricanAmericans.' The Labor Report cited a second difference
between race and age: everyone, regardless of socioeconomic or
educational background, ultimately enters the group of people
over forty." One's race, in contrast, is immutable." In addition,
82

Id. at 169-71. In Gunther, the Supreme Court held that the so-called

Bennett Amendment, which transplanted defenses from the Equal Pay Act into Title
VII, did not restrict Title VII's prohibition of sex-based discrimination to claims of
equal pay for equal work as defined in the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 168. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court distinguished Title VII from the Equal Pay Act, noting that Title
VII prohibits "practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.'" Id. at
170 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). By contrast, "[t]he
fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act [the "other factors other than age"
defense] . . .was designed differently, to confine the application of the Act to wage
differentials attributable to sex discrimination." Id. at 170.
83 Smith, 351 F.3d at 190-93.
84 Id.

Id.
" Id. at 193, 203 n.8.
87 Id. at
194.
"8 See Smith, 351 F.3d at 193.
85

89

Id.

"0 Id. (citing LABOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 352).
91 Id. (citing
92

Id.

LABOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 352).
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the court emphasized that Griggs established disparate impact
protection in race discrimination cases, at least in part, to
eradicate the present effects of past discrimination that have
excluded African-Americans from employment opportunities. 3
In contrast to racial discrimination, age discrimination does not
burden individuals during their entire lives with bigoted
attitudes that their parents and grandparents endured.
Rather, age discrimination affects the very workers who once
benefited from positive attitudes directed toward workers in
their twenties and thirties.'
The
court
also
stressed the Labor
Report's
recommendation that the law prohibit only "arbitrary"
discrimination against older workers.95 Because the Labor
Report characterized "arbitrary discrimination" as arising from
stereotypes about older workers, the court reasoned that the
Labor Report used "arbitrary" as a synonym for "intentional.'"
On the other hand, the Labor Report proposed that systemic
disadvantages
incidentally
affecting older workers
presumably incidents of disparate impact - be remedied with
educational programs and institutional restructuring rather
than statutory proscriptions.9 7
This analysis led the court to conclude that the ADEA
should not be coextensive with the broad remedial scope of
Title VII, which protects racial minorities from the
unintentional, discriminatory affects of facially neutral
employment practices."'
3. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Stewart disagreed with the majority's conclusion
denying the applicability of disparate impact theory to the
ADEA 9 Similar to the majority, he began by enlisting support
93 Smith, 351 F.3d at 194-95.
94 Id. at 195.
95 Id. at 194 (characterizing the Labor Report as recommending legislative

action to address "arbitrary" discrimination rather than systemic disadvantages
incidentally afflicting older workers (citing Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 703
(1st Cir. 1999)). The court noted that Congress confirmed these findings through
extensive factfinding of its own (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 230-31
(1983)).
" Id. at 194 n.13.
9' Mullin, 164 F.3d at 703.
9" Smith, 351 F.3d at 195.
Id. at 198-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Judge Stewart agreed with the
majority's disposition vacating the dismissal of the disparate treatment claims. Id.
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from circuit courts that had recognized disparate impact
coverage for victims of age discrimination."' He supported his
view by arguing that Title VII and the ADEA are statutes in
pari materia, a canon of construction calling for like
interpretation of statutes governing similar relationships. 1
The aptness of this doctrine arose from three circumstances:
both Title VII and the ADEA regulate the employment
relationship, the ADEA grew out of congressional debates on
Title VII, and the language of the prohibitory sections of Title
VII and the ADEA is nearly identical. 0 '
Concentrating on the RFOA provision, Judge Stewart
argued that it codified the business necessity defense
established in Griggs.'1 3 Although his explanation was sketchy,
he suggested that the word "reasonable" in the RFOA provision
does not permit an employer to escape liability by relying on
any factor other than age. 4 Rather, the safe harbor applies
only to "reasonable" factors other than age. A reasonable factor,
Judge Stewart suggested, is a factor supported by a business
necessity.'' Thus, Judge Stewart concluded that the RFOA
defense incorporates disparate impact protection into the
ADEA, even providing for the business necessity defense,
100 Id.

at 200. He cited authority from the Second and Eighth Circuits. Id.

101 Id. at 201.
102 Id. at 201.
103

Smith, 351 F.3d at 200.

Id. at 200 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The EEOC supports Judge Stewart's
position. It issued an interpretive guideline, adopting disparate impact coverage under
the ADEA. The interpretive guideline provides:
When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis for
different treatment of employees or applicants for employment on the
grounds that it is a 'factor other than' age, and such a practice has an adverse
impact on individuals within the protected age group, it can only be justified
as a business necessity.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2004). The Smith majority accorded little deference to this
guideline, based on its belief that the EEOC, in "the absence of significant analysis,"
issued the guideline in the wake of Griggs. 351 F.3d at 189 n.5. The court alluded to
subsequent developments, casting doubt on the persuasiveness of the guideline presumably the Hazen Paperdecision and perhaps the numerous circuit court decisions
spelling out arguments contrary to the position taken by the EEOC. Id. The majority's
reasons for according little weight to the interpretive guideline find support in EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257-58 (1991) (superseded by statute as stated in
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)) (instructing in dicta that the
persuasive force of an EEOC interpretive guideline depends on (i) whether the EEOC
promulgated the guideline contemporaneously with enactment of the statute, (ii)
whether the EEOC was rigorous in its reasoning, and (iii) whether the guideline has
support in the statute's language). Judge Stewart did not rely on the interpretive
guideline, nor did he attempt to rebut the majority's dismissive view toward it. Smith,
351 F.3d at 198-203 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
105 Smith, 351 F.3d at 200 (Stewart. J., dissenting).
104

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:2

though not in language identical to that used in Griggs."° Judge
Stewart punctuated this point by attacking the majority's
comparison between the RFOA defense and the language of the
Equal Pay Act. 17 As the majority conceded, while the Equal Pay
Act permits "any" factor other than sex to stand as a legal
justification for a wage differential, the RFOA exception of the
ADEA permits only "reasonable" factors other than age to serve
as a defense to an age discrimination claim. '
Turning to legislative history, Judge Stewart found the
majority's analysis of the Labor Report irrelevant because the
ADEA, enacted in 1967, predated the advent of disparate
impact theory in Griggs by four years."a Thus, Congress could
not have contemplated the preclusion of a legal theory that had
not yet come into existence."'0 Moreover, he interpreted the
Labor Report to urge the elimination of age-related stereotypes
in the workplace, a goal which the implementation of disparate
impact theory would help achieve.'
Judge Stewart assailed the majority's argument that
Title VII's broad remedial policy, which has no counterpart in
the ADEA, renders disparate impact protection inappropriate
for the victims of age discrimination. Although he read Griggs,
as did the Smith majority, to seek the eradication of the effects
106
107

,

Id.
Id.
Id. at 200-01.

109 Id. at 201.
110 Smith,

351 F.3d at 201. Judge Stewart's argument is curious inasmuch as

he interpreted the RFOA exception to provide for disparate impact protection. If, as
Judge Stewart contends, Congress had no inkling of the disparate impact theory,
Congress could not have intended the RFOA exception to create liability based on that
theory.
11, Id. at 203 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Judge Stewart discerned congressional
intent to allow age-based disparate impact claims from passage of the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act. Id. This statute safeguards older workers from predatory
actions of employers seeking to extract releases of claims in exchange for severance
packages. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626(f)(1)(E)-(G), 630(f) (2000). Judge Stewart reasoned
that the statutory requirement of providing such employees with statistics comparing
the age of terminated workers with retained workers shows the congressional intent to
recognize disparate impact claims in age cases. Smith, 351 F.3d at 203 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); see 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H)(ii) (2000); see also Roberta S. Alexander,
Comment, The Future of Disparate Impact Analysis for Age Discrimination in a PostHazen Paper World, 25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 75, 99-100 (1999) (arguing that the only
conceivable reason for this statutory provision is to aid older workers in determining
whether they have valid disparate impact claims). As Chief Judge White explained in
Smith, this argument is unpersuasive because the statistics could be used to help
establish a disparate treatment claim rather than a disparate impact claim. 351 F.3d
at 193 n.12 (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (accepting
statistical data as determinative in a pattern and practice disparate treatment case)).
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of past discrimination, he also interpreted Griggs to seek
elimination of the consequences of discrimination, even absent
invidious animus or historical injustice.'12 The goal of
eliminating the consequences of unintentional discrimination
applies to age as much as it does to race. Also, he stressed that
disparate impact is an essential tool for uncovering the subtle
discriminatory acts of cagey employers who, although inclined
to discriminate, wish to avoid a date at the courthouse."' Subtle
discriminatory practices might escape redress by disparate
treatment analysis, which requires the plaintiff to prove
elusive discriminatory intent. Such practices are more readily
extirpated from the workplace by the use of disparate impact
theory. Finally, he observed that disparate impact theory
and
religious
origin,
to
gender, national
applies
discrimination."' Victims of these forms of discrimination do
not confront the same level of animus endured by victims of
racial discrimination. Nor do they suffer from the generational
legacy of past discrimination. Thus, he argued that disparate
impact protection reaches more broadly than the majority
recognized."'
The opinions of Chief Judge King and Judge Stewart in
Smith illustrate the salient legal arguments. Part IV analyzes
these arguments in greater depth, and determines that they
are inconclusive. The lack of a decisive legal argument points
the inquiry to policy considerations that this article will
examine in Part V.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS

The legal analysis begins with a comparison of the
prohibitory section of the ADEA and the provision after which
it was modeled: the prohibitory section of Title VII."' The
similarity between these provisions favors those who would
engraft disparate impact liability into the ADEA. The analysis
then turns to a series of counterarguments, none of which is
convincing. First, this article examines the provision that has
..Smith, 351 F.3d at 202-03 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"1 See id. at 202. See also Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination:A StructuralApproach, 101 COLUM. L, REV. 458, 468 (2001) (arguing
that subtle discrimination, perpetuated by organizational structures, causes more
harm than blatant forms of discrimination).
'"
Smith, 351 F.3d at 202-03 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"'.

Id. at 203.

"1 See infra Part IV.A.1.
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captured the attention of both the judiciary and scholars: the
RFOA defense."7 Many have concluded that this defense
resolves the question. Unfortunately, the answer depends on
who is doing the talking. This article concludes that the RFOA
defense does not resolve the issue because it addresses
disparate treatment rather than disparate impact claims.
Another argument arises from the Labor Report, which
provides some support for opponents of age-based disparate
impact claims, but the Labor Report is susceptible to conflicting
interpretations."" This Part then focuses on passages from
Hazen Paper."' Though some try to extract hidden innuendo
from Justice O'Connor's discussion, their efforts are
unsuccessful because the implications of Justice O'Connor's
remarks are ambiguous. This Part concludes with an
examination of the argument that congressional inaction
suggests the intent not to incorporate disparate impact
protection into the ADEA.'2° This final argument, though
appealing, is not wholly persuasive.
A.

Textual Arguments
1. The Prohibitory Provisions

Similarities between the texts of the ADEA and Title
VII support the position that the ADEA, like Title VII, provides
a claim for disparate impact. Like the prohibitory provision of
Title VII, which forbids employers to discriminate "because of'
race, national origin, sex, and religion, the analogous provision
of the ADEA forbids employment discrimination "because of'
age. In Lorillard v. Pons,"' the Supreme Court noted, "[tihere
are important similarities between [Title VII and the ADEA] ..
. both in their aims - the elimination of discrimination from the
workplace - and in their substantive prohibitions. In fact, the
prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title

,..See infra Part IV.A.2.
118See infra Part TV.B.
'19See infra Part IV.C.
120

See infra Part IV.D.

434 U.S. 575 (1978). See also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750,
755-56 (1979) (construing § 14(b) of the ADEA, a procedural provision. governing the
timing for the filing of federal discrimination claims, similarly to § 706(c) of Title VII
because the acts share a common purpose and because the ADEA section was modeled
after the Title VII section).
121
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VII.' 2. Though Lorillard did not hold that the ADEA covers
disparate impact claims, some have inferred that if the
prohibitory language of Title VII forbids disparate impact
discrimination, the same conclusion must flow from the
essentially identical language of the ADEA. Following this
reasoning, the Second Circuit, in Geller v. Markham,'
recognized age-based disparate impact claims.24
Two counterarguments deserve comment. First, the
Griggs Court did not cite a particular provision of Title VII to
support the recognition of disparate impact claims. 5 Finding
this gap in the Court's explanation significant, Judge Lamberth
in Hyman v. First Union Corp., 6 commented that "reliance on
a simple comparison of the language of the two statutes
appears to be misplaced." 7 Judge Lamberth's point, however,
is not convincing. Though not citing a particular provision of
Title VII, the Court did rely expressly on the statute. The Court
noted:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from
Under the Act, practices,
the language of the statute ....
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms
of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status
12
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."

In Connecticut v. Teal,'' the Court expressly anchored
disparate impact theory to § 703(a)(2) of Title VII. 2" Comparing
the language of this provision to the language of § 623(a)(2),
the analogous provision in the ADEA, is therefore quite
relevant.
Second, there is a textual difference between the two
statutes. Title VII expressly prohibits discrimination against
"applicants for employment,""'. whereas the ADEA does not.
Some judges and commentators observe that disparate impact
122
122
124

Lorillard,434 U.S. at 584.
635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1032. Hazen Paper, decided thirteen years after Geller, arguably

undermined the cogency of the Second Circuit's reliance on Lorillard because the
Supreme Court emphasized that it had never ruled on whether the ADEA permits
disparate impact claims. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
125 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
126 980 F. Supp. 38 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
127 Id. at 42.
126 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
129

457 U.S. 440 (1982).
at 445-46.

130Id.
122

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).
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violations most frequently affect applicants rather than
incumbent employees.13 These judges and commentators reason
that, because the ADEA does not expressly forbid
discrimination against "applicants for employment," the ADEA
does not provide disparate impact protection.' This argument
fails, however, because disparate impact applies to all phases of
the employment relationship from hiring to discharge. In
Griggs, the seminal disparate impact case, for example, the
Court upheld the claim of incumbent black employees stymied
from advancement by a high school diploma requirement and
aptitude testing requirements that had no demonstrated
correlation with job performance." Moreover, despite the
ADEA's omission of express language protecting applicants, the
courts have applied the statute uniformly to discriminatory
hiring practices.'3'
M

2. The RFOA Defense
Section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA exempts from liability
employers who take action otherwise prohibited by the Act
"where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age." Thus, § 623(f)(1) permits "reasonable factors other
than age" as a basis for differentiation - or discrimination.
Opponents of disparate impact protection under the ADEA rely
most heavily on this section for support. They argue that §
132 E.g., EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994)

(observing that "[tihe 'mirror' provision in the ADEA omits from its coverage
'applicants for employment,'" and concluding that this omission is "noteworthy" given
the essentially identical language of the prohibitory sections of Title VII and the
ADEA); Pamela S. Krop, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34
STAN. L. REV. 837, 843 (1982) (stating that it would be "anomalous for Congress to
authorize disparate impact in section 4(a)(2) and yet exclude the group of plaintiffs
most likely to benefit from such a claim").
133 See supra notes 73, 132 and accompanying
text.
lu 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See also, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999-1000 (1988) (applying disparate impact analysis to subjective
promotion criteria).
135 E.g., Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1006-10 (10th Cir. 1996)
(entertaining disparate treatment claims of applicants for flight attendant positions,
and affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment for United because the
plaintiffs failed to prove that United Airlines' maximum weight standards were a
pretext for age discrimination); Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1078 (entertaining
disparate treatment claim brought by EEOC on behalf of teacher denied a position, and
affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school because the
plaintiff failed to prove that the challenged salary system was a subterfuge for age
discrimination); Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303, 309 (4th Cir. 1981)
(holding United Airlines' hiring requirement that pilots be at least thirty-five years old
is not a bona fide occupational qualification).
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623(f)(1) can mean only one thing: an employment practice that
unintentionally has a discriminatory impact on workers over
forty is permissible. By putting this gloss on the section, one
negates disparate impact protection under the ADEA because
disparate impact theory forbids exactly what this section, so
Absent business necessity, disparate
interpreted, allows.
impact theory would prohibit employment practices that
differentiate between workers over forty compared to other
workers, whereas § 623(f)(1) would allow all such
differentiations. As Chief Judge King noted in Smith, the
Equal Pay Act contains a provision similar to § 623(f)(1)."'6 The
Equal Pay Act provision permits an employer to use "any other
factor other than sex," as a basis for a wage differential." In
Washington v. Gunther the Supreme Court interpreted the
"any other factor other than sex" provision to preclude
disparate impact claims under the Equal Pay Act.'
Proponents of disparate impact protection under the
ADEA expose the fallacy of this argument. Unlike the Equal
Pay Act, § 623(0(1) does not permit "any" factor other than age.
Rather it permits only "reasonable" factors other than age. By
limiting the scope of permissible factors to those that are
"reasonable," the subsection implies that unreasonable factors
are impermissible. A reasonable factor, argue the proponents,
is one justified by business necessity, proven most often by
linking the practice to job performance. 9 Thus, proponents
read the subsection to reflect the holding of Griggs. An
employment practice, though not motivated by discriminatory
intent, which nevertheless disproportionately affects workers
over forty, is illegal unless the employer links the practice to
business necessity or job performance. "0
The proponents' argument, however, also suffers from
an interpretive flaw. Section 623(f)(1) permits employers to rely
on "reasonable" factors other than age. The subsection
136 Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 191-92
(5th Cir. 2003) (citing
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169-71 (1981) (analyzing the "other
factors other than age" provision of the Equal Pay Act)).
137 Smith, 351 F.3d at 192. See also 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1) (2000).
138 Gunther, 452 U.S. at 169-71.

139 See, e.g., Jonas Saunders, Note, Age Discrimination: Disparate Impact

Under the ADEA After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins: Arguments in Favor, 73 U. DET.

MERCY L. REv. 591, 605 (1996) (arguing that facially neutral employment practices are
unreasonable under the RFOA defense if they are not "job related or based upon a
business necessity").
140 See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
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prohibits only unreasonable or arbitrary factors. A reasonable
factor - one that is not arbitrary - is not equivalent to a
business necessity as that term is defined in Griggs and
subsequent Supreme Court cases. Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell4' is instructive on this point. The Criswell Court
interpreted the scope of the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) defense in a disparate treatment, age discrimination
case. The BFOQ defense permits age discrimination "where age
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
4 2 The issue
for the normal operation of the particular business.""
in Criswell was whether Western's mandatory retirement
policy for flight engineers at age sixty was a BFOQ.'4 ' The trial
court instructed the jury that the "BFOQ defense is available
only if it is reasonably necessary to the normal operation or
essence of defendant's business."'" Western objected to the jury
instruction, arguing that the district court should have
instructed the jury to defer to "Western's selection of job
qualifications for the position of [flight engineer] that are
reasonable in light of the safety risks."' The Supreme Court
upheld the trial courts rejection of Western's proposed
instruction because "reasonable necessity" is a more stringent
standard than "reasonableness.' 4 6 The Court even observed
that using the "rational basis in fact" standard - which is the
functional equivalent of using the reasonableness test - would
be tantamount to instructing the jury to return a verdict for
Western.'4 7
141472 U.S. 400 (2000).
142

29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).

143 472

U.S. at 405-06.

'4
Id. at 407. The judge followed the instruction given in Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). A Usery instruction permits the
employer to establish a BFOQ defense in two ways. First, the employer may show that
it has a factual basis to believe that all or substantially all of those persons over a
certain age cannot perform the job responsibilities safely and efficiently. Criswell, 472
U.S. at 414 (citing Usery, 531 F.3d at 235 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969))). Alternatively, the employer may prove that it
is highly impractical to assess capabilities of older workers on an individual basis, and
that some members of the discriminated-against class possess a trait precluding safe
and efficient performance. Id. at 414-15.
"4 Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at
30, Criswell (No. 83-1545)).

146 Id.

Id.

at 421. Western argued to the Supreme Court that it merely had to
show a rational basis to prove that it was highly impractical to assess the capabilities
of older workers individually. The Court rejected Western's argument because applying
the rational basis test would have assured a verdict for Western. Requiring only a
147
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The same semantic analysis applies to the RFOA
defense. If one assumes that the ADEA includes disparate
impact claims, the "reasonable factors other than age" defense
permits practices that are reasonable even if they not justified
by "business necessity."14 A reasonable factor, as noted, is not
arbitrary or irrational. Rather, it makes sense on its face. The
height and weight requirements in Dothard v. Rawlinson"'
might have been reasonable in light of the duties of prison
guards, but the prison authority did not demonstrate with
admissible evidence that these requirements were business
necessities within the meaning of Griggs. To prove business
necessity, an employer must often present evidence of expert
In
validation studies, grounded in statistical analysis."
engaged
example,
Albemarle
Albemarle Paper v. Moody,"' for
an industrial psychologist to validate the relationship between
job performance and its testing program used for hiring and
promotion.1 2 The Supreme Court scrutinized the statistical
methodology of the validation study and ultimately rejected
it.10
rational basis falls short of the statutory requirement of proving that the selection
criteria were "reasonably necessary." Id.
148 See Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not Wards Cove Packing?
That is Not the Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 819, 840-41 (1997) (arguing

that a "reasonable" factor, within the meaning of the RFOA defense, meets the test of
business rationality, a standard less onerous than business necessity).
149 433 U.S. 321, 324 & n.2
(1977).
'50 See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 429 (1975)
(discussed infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d
1027, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1980) (approving of an expert statistical analysis demonstrating
a correlation between age and defendant's hiring program). But see New York Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31 (1979) (approving Transit Authority's rule
excluding participants in Methadone program from employment although no statistical
evidence linked Methadone treatment to inadequate performance, even for jobs not
involving safety concerns).
152

422 U.S. 405 (1975).
Id. at 429.

'

Id. at 429-36. The Court catalogued many deficiencies of the validation

151

study. Overall, the Court was skeptical of the study because plant officials conducted it
without oversight only four months before the case went to trial. Id. at 434. The Court
also criticized the statistical methodology. The study correlated test scores with blind,
subjective performance evaluations of supervisors. Id. at 432. The supervisors were
asked to "determine which [employees) they felt irrespective of the job that they were
actually doing, but in their respective jobs, did a better job than the person they were
rating against. . . ." Id. at 433. The Court, though granting that such subjective
comparisons are an acceptable validation method, questioned the vagueness of the
standards on which the subjective evaluations were made. Id. The study focused on
performance at jobs near the top of various lines of job progression. The Court also
challenged this aspect of the study because performance ratings at relatively high-level
jobs may not indicate performance ratings at lower-level jobs. Id. at 434. Finally, the
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As Criswell states, proving reasonableness is a far
easier undertaking. A facially reasonable explanation meets
this test without resort to standard deviations or regression
analysis. Thus, if the proponents are right and § 623(a)(2)
creates disparate impact liability, disparate impact protection
under the ADEA is a fragile veneer pierced by any reasonable
explanation. One might ask why Congress would create a claim
so easily defeated. The answer is that § 623(f)(1) does not refer
to disparate impact at all. When Congress enacted the ADEA
in 1967, Griggs, which created disparate impact theory, would
not be decided for another four years. Early civil rights
legislation
was
aimed
at
eliminating
intentional
discrimination. It is doubtful that in 1967 Congress even
conceived of prohibiting facially neutral employment practices
with disproportionate effects on protected classes. Disparate
impact was beyond the congressional horizon.
Only one logical explanation for the RFOA defense
remains.
The RFOA defense
applies to intentional
discrimination, that is, disparate treatment. Dean Player
disagrees with this interpretation because he sees it as
circular. He argues that "[i]f section 4(a) [the prohibitory
section of the ADEA] does not extend beyond age motivation,
there would be no need to have the 4(f)(1) [RFOA] defense
because age motivated decisions could not possibly be for
reasons 'other than age.""' In other words, Congress would not
create a pointless statutory rule providing that it is acceptable
for an employer to make decisions based on obviously
permissible criteria, that is, reasonable factors other than age.
Dean Player concludes that the ADEA must therefore prohibit
disparate impact violations. 5'
Although enticing, Dean Player's reading of the statute
misses the purpose of the RFOA defense. By permitting
employers to make adverse employment decisions based on
"reasonable factors other than age," the ADEA countenanced
an employer's reliance on factors that correlate with age, such
as high wages, or spiraling benefit costs. The RFOA defense

Court objected to the study because it tested the performance of experienced, white
workers, rather than inexperienced, black applicants. Id. at 435.
154 Player, supra note 148, at 832.
155 See id. at 832-33. Dean Player invokes the rule of statutory construction
that prefers an interpretation avoiding redundancy and surplusage over other
interpretations. Id. at 833.
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means that refusing to hire or firing an older worker to cut
costs provides no evidence of discriminatory intent.
There is substantial support for this interpretation.
First, support comes from the placement of the RFOA defense
in the ADEA. The BFOQ defense exempts employers from
liability for intentional discrimination when age is a bona fide
occupational qualification. This defense appears in § 623(f)(1),
the same subsection where the RFOA defense appears. The two
defenses are separated merely by the disjunctive "or." It is
logical that Congress meant the RFOA defense, like its
neighbor the BFOQ defense, to apply to intentional
discrimination. If Congress had intended the RFOA defense to
apply to a different kind of discrimination - disparate impact it would have made its purpose intelligible.
It is understandable why Congress included the RFOA
defense in the ADEA. Discrimination against older workers
differs from discrimination against all other protected classes.
Once can hardly contrive a sensible argument that the cost of
employing a qualified black worker exceeds the cost of
employing a qualified white worker. It similarly makes no
sense to contend that employing a qualified woman costs an
employer more than employing a qualified man. Employing
older workers, however, often entails escalating costs. The most
obvious is a wage differential. Age correlates with years of
service. Years of service correlate with relatively high wages.
Thus, older workers tend on average to earn more than
younger ones. If Congress had not crafted the RFOA defense,
older workers fired as a result of cost-trimming measures
would argue that firing the top salaried employees (who tend to
be over forty) constitutes proof of intentional age
discrimination.
This argument is not merely a hypothetical possibility.
In Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc.," the plaintiff argued that
replacing him with a younger, lower-salaried worker
constituted intentional discrimination in violation of the
ADEA. 7 The employer asserted an RFOA defense based on
cost-justification," but the Seventh Circuit rejected the

15 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
157 See
"

id. at 1203-04.

Id. at 1206.
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defense, "9 and sustained the employee's disparate treatment
claim."
The issue whether an employer violates the ADEA by
relying on factors that correlate with age was so significant
that the Supreme Court addressed it. In Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins,' the plaintiff proved that he was fired because his
pension was about to vest."2 Because pension vesting correlates
with age, he contended that his discharge was proof of
intentional age discrimination. The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that age and pension vesting, though correlated, are
analytically distinct.'3 An older worker, for example, may be
newly hired, whereas a worker in his thirties and therefore not
in the protected class, may have accrued the ten years of
service needed for a pension to vest under Hazen Paper's
plan."' The Court emphasized that Hazen Paper's misconduct
violated ERISA."' It also recognized that using pension vesting
as a proxy for age, that is, "Let's get rid of our workers over
fifty by firing everyone whose pension is about to vest," would
violate the ADEA because it would prove intentional age
discrimination.' Simply firing a worker, who happens to be in
the protected class, to prevent his pension from vesting,
however, does not violate the ADEA."7
Hazen Paper did not raise the RFOA defense, and
therefore the Court did not rely on the defense or even refer to

159

Id.

Id. at 1208-11. See also Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp.
715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (rejecting a cost-justification defense in a disparate treatment
case, and noting "[wihere economic savings and expectation of longer future service are
directly related to an employee's age, it is a violation of the ADEA to discharge the
employee for those reasons"), affd in part and rev'd in part without opinion, 608 F.2d
1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
161 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
'60

162

Id. at 607.

3

Id. at 611.

164

id.

1 Id. at 612. The Court pointed out that firing a black worker over age forty

because the worker is black does not violate the ADEA, though such conduct violates
Title VII. Id. Thus, as a matter of strategy, if a worker in two protected classes believes
his employer has discriminated against him, the worker must consider suing under
both theories since proof of discrimination under one theory will not advance his case
under a second theory. Proof of discrimination based on a classification not alleged in
the complaint or presented to the EEOC may furnish the employer with a defense.
Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 612-13. The Court also reserved decision on
'6
cases where a pension vests when an employee reaches a certain age, rather than when
he completes a specified number of years of service. Id. at 613.
167 Id. at 613.
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it.'
The reason for this omission may have been that
interference with the vesting of a pension, rather than being a
reasonable factor, is an illegal and therefore unreasonable one.
Thus, the RFOA defense, which envisions legitimate businessrelated factors and not illegal motives, did not apply. The
outcome of the case, however, comports with the spirit of the
RFOA defense by rendering factors other than age irrelevant to
the issue of discriminatory intent.
The wisdom of Hazen Paper is open to question because
the Court excluded the pension-related evidence from
consideration although Biggins had presented other evidence of
discriminatory intent at trial. Given the independent evidence
of discriminatory intent, one might argue that the pensionrelated evidence circumstantially supported the case." The
same argument applies to the RFOA defense. The RFOA
defense may mean that evidence of reasonable factors other
than age cannot by itself support a case of disparate treatment
age discrimination, but the defense may be read to allow such
evidence when the plaintiff presents other proof of
discriminatory intent. In other words, one may construe the
RFOA defense to mean that to prove discriminatory intent the
plaintiff may not rely on reasonable factors other than age as
the sole motivation for the adverse action, though such factors
might be considered as contributing to the adverse employment
action. Regardless of which of these two variations one adopts,
Hazen Paper protects business from economic hardship.
169

See Respondents' Brief at 33-39, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604

(1993) (No. 91-1600), available at 1992 WL 511975 at *33-39 (Sept. 4, 1992)
(containing no reference to the RFOA defense).
169 Biggins offered proof of discriminatory intent in addition to the evidence
that Hazen Paper fired him to prevent his pension from vesting. Though hardly
overwhelming, that evidence consisted in part of his employer's insistence that he sign
an onerous confidentiality agreement, which no other employees were required to sign.
Furthermore, Hazen Paper presented Biggins' younger replacement with a less
onerous agreement. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 613. In remanding the case to the First
Circuit, the Supreme Court instructed the circuit court to consider whether the
evidence of discriminatory intent, excluding evidence related to the pension, was
sufficient to support an ADEA violation. Id. at 614. Thus, the Supreme Court held, not
merely that the pension-related evidence standing alone could not support a violation,
but it also held that such evidence could not be considered in conjunction with other
evidence of discriminatory intent. See Respondents' Brief at 33-39, Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (No. 91-1600) (arguing that firing Biggins to prevent his
pension from vesting was, in conjunction with other proof offered at trial, evidence of
intentional age discrimination). See also Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform
Structure of Disparate Treatment DiscriminationLitigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 573
(1996) (criticizing Hazen Paper for discounting evidence that Biggins was fired to
prevent his pension from vesting even as circumstantial proof of discrimination).
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Employers need not fear lawsuits because they made rational,
cost-saving business decisions, even if those decisions
incidentally disadvantaged older workers.
Hazen Paper does not resolve whether disparate impact
theory applies to workers over forty. One may infer
nevertheless that if the ADEA's prohibitory section, like its
counterpart in Title VII, allows for disparate impact claims, a
reasonable cost-cutting measure that correlates with age is not
actionable, even if the defendant cannot prove that the
measure rises to the level of a business necessity. Still, the
more basic question - whether the ADEA even includes
disparate impact protection - stands unanswered. An analysis
of the legislative history of the ADEA presents another
approach to resolving the issue.
B.

The Legislative History

Congress, in § 715 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, directed
Willard Wirtz, the Secretary of Labor, to study the problem of
age discrimination and to report his findings.1 70 Secretary Wirtz
submitted the Labor Report to Congress, and subsequently,
complying with another congressional directive, submitted a
draft bill destined to become the ADEA."' Congress confirmed
the findings of the Labor Report, "2 which is the principle source
of the ADEA's legislative history. 173 The Labor Report has
therefore generated a wealth of commentary. Some judges and
scholars point to the Labor Report as proof that Congress did
not intend to incorporate disparate impact protection into the

7 Section 715 directed the Secretary of Labor to transmit to Congress a
'study of the factors which might tend to result in discrimination in employment
because of age and of the consequences of such discrimination." See Letter of
Transmittal from W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, to Hon. John W. McCormack,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey, President of
the Senate (June 30, 1965), in LABOR REPORT, supra note 4. See also EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1983) (reviewing the legislative history of the ADEA).
1
See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 230.
172

Id. at 230-31.

'73 See id. (discussing the influence of the Labor Report on Congress); Alfred
W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or Impact, in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND
PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 83 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982) (referring to the Labor
Report as the document responsible for "shaping the thinking in Congress" that
culminated in the enactment of the ADEA).
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ADEA.'7' Others find the Labor Report ambiguous or even an
indication that the ADEA permits disparate impact claims."5
A careful analysis must recognize that Secretary Wirtz
submitted the Labor Report to Congress in 1965, six years
before Griggs, the landmark Supreme Court decision that
created disparate impact theory and applied it to racial
discrimination.7 ' This chronology does not imply that Secretary
Wirtz could not have contemplated the theory of disparate
impact. He may have pioneered the theory. It does suggest,
however, that ambiguities should not lead to the uncritical
conclusion that he meant to take a position on the issue when
other interpretations are equally plausible.
Based on a thorough analysis of the ADEA's legislative
history, which centers on the Labor Report, Professor
Blumrosen argues that Congress did not intend the ADEA to
permit claims of disparate impact.'77 He underscores two
separate problems that the Labor Report identifies. First,
under the heading "Arbitrary Discrimination: Specific Age
Limits," the Labor Report states, "[tlhe most obvious kind of
age discrimination in employment takes the form of employer
policies of not hiring people over a certain age, without
individual
particular
applicant's
of a
consideration
qualifications."17 Professor Blumrosen concludes that the Labor
Report equates "arbitrary discrimination" with specific age
limits, 9 and he points out that the Labor Report calls for
federal legislation outlawing "arbitrary discrimination."..
14 See,
e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003)
(underscoring the policy differences of Title VII and the ADEA as revealed in the Labor
Report); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 703 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that "the
Report's findings suggest that the theory [of disparate impact] has no utility in age
discrimination cases"); Blumrosen, supra note 173, at 79 (arguing that the Labor
Report proposed making only intentional discrimination illegal, not unintentional
institutional arrangements that have a disproportionate adverse effect on older
workers).
',5 Smith, 351 F.3d at 203 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(interpreting the Labor
Report to embrace disparate impact liability because an express purpose of the Labor
Report was to address discrimination not based on animus); Steven J. Kaminshine, The

Cost of Older Workers, DisparateImpact, and the Age Discriminationin Employment

Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 290-98 (1990) (criticizing Blumrosen's analysis and
concluding that the Labor Report is ambiguous and even may reasonably be
interpreted to recommend the adoption of disparate impact liability).
176Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
17
Blumrosen, supra note 173, at 73.
178 LABOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. See Blumrosen, supra note 173,
at 76.
79 Blumrosen, supra note 173, at 76.
'8' Id. at 77; LABOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 21-22.
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The Labor Report's next section raises a separate
concern affecting older workers: "It is equally important to
recognize
the force of certain circumstances
which
unquestionably affect older workers more strongly as a group
than they do younger workers."18' One such circumstance is
"institutional arrangements" such as seniority systems under
collective bargaining agreements, pension and health
insurance costs, and the practice of promotion from within.'82
However, the Labor Report recommends non-statutory
measures to address institutional arrangements that diminish
the employment prospects of older workers. These measures
include restructuring
benefit plans,"
and improving
educational opportunities." Professor Blumrosen argues,
"[these separate and distinct recommendations reinforce the
conclusion that the statutory prohibition on age discrimination
was intended to prohibit only specific age limits for hiring or
termination. " " He characterizes "institutional practice(s)" that
have an "'adverse effect' on older workers" as having a
disparate impact on older workers, and he notes that the Labor
Report does not propose making such practices illegal."
Professor Blumrosen's analysis may be right, but it just
as easily may be wrong. A second, brisk walk through the
Labor Report raises questions about the persuasiveness of
Professor Blumrosen's interpretation. After enumerating three
variations of intentional discrimination, the Labor Report
discusses a fourth type of discrimination: rejecting older
workers because of institutional arrangements, including
seniority systems, promotion-from-within, and pension and
insurance programs. As shown above, Professor Blumrosen
characterizes this form of discrimination as disparate impact,
but the Report contradicts this characterization by noting that
the costs of these programs "push still further down the age at
which employers begin asking whether or not a prospective
employee is too old to be taken on." So defined, his practice is a
form of conscious discrimination, not disparate impact.
A passage in the Findings section of the Labor Report
also contradicts Professor Blumrosen's view. Secretary Wirtz,
181

LABOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.

182

Id. at 15-17.

'83
14

Id. at 22.

Id. at 24-25.

" Blumrosen, supra note 173, at 79.
'8 Id. at 79.
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type of discrimination
while discussing the fourth
(discrimination arising from institutional arrangements), notes
that "institutional arrangements which operate indirectly to
restrict the employment of older workers" may cause "arbitrary
discrimination." Use of the word "arbitrary," according to
Professor Blumrosen, indicates intentional discrimination, not
disparate impact. Yet Professor Blumrosen argues that the
Labor Report treats "institutional arrangements" as examples
of disparate impact or unintentional discrimination. Either in
its use of the word "arbitrary" or in its treatment of
"institutional arrangements," the Labor Report does not square
with Professor Blumrosen's analysis.
In the Conclusions and Recommendations section, the
Labor Report proposes that "to adjust those present
employment practices which quite unintentionally lead to age
limits in hiring," employers should adjust pension and seniority
arrangements." The phrase "unintentionally lead to age limits
in hiring" suggests disparate impact. As Professor Blumrosen
points out, rather than recommending civil liability to confront
these problems, the Labor Report proposes restructuring.'
Thus, the Labor Report seems to reject disparate impact
liability. The next sentence of the Labor Report, however,
clashes with this interpretation by suggesting that new pension
and seniority arrangements are needed to overcome employer
reluctance to hire qualified older workers."' Employer
reluctance suggests the intent to discriminate, which is an
element of disparate treatment, not disparate impact. The
Labor Report's apparent conflict in using the words
"unintentional" and "reluctance" may be explained by
recognizing that employers do not adopt pension plans to
discriminate against older workers, but a consequence may
nevertheless be employer reluctance to hire older workers
because of increased costs."' This explanation contradicts
Professor Blumrosen's position.
The Labor Report notes that inadequate education bars
some older workers from desirable jobs."' This sounds like
disparate impact. To address this problem, the Labor Report
187 LABOR REPORT,

supra note 4, at 22.

188 Blumrosen, supra note 173, at 78-79.
189 LABOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 22.
1"0

Id. at

16.

191 LABOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 11-12.
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recommends more training and education, not lawsuits. 92
Professor Blumrosen concludes that the Labor Report therefore
rejects disparate impact under the ADEA."3 The Labor Report,
however, was merely pointing out that employers sometimes
reject older workers because they are unqualified
educationally." More education is the obvious remedy. The
Labor Report would have made no sense if it had proposed civil
lawsuits to address the legitimate rejection of older
undereducated workers. In other words, the Labor Report
merely recognizes that rejecting an older worker for justifiable
business reasons should not be actionable. It does not follow
that the Labor Report intends to foreclose disparate impact
claims, which arise when an employer's illegitimate
educational requirements result unintentionally in the
rejection of older workers.
Some of these ambiguities might be read to exclude
disparate impact liability from the ADEA. Congress, however,
did not prepare the Labor Report - the Department of Labor
did. Although Congress endorsed the Labor Report, it surely
did not intend to adopt every nuance of ambiguous language,
even if a phrase or two might be interpreted to suggest the
emergence and simultaneous rejection of a novel and unnamed
doctrine.
C.

The Implicationsof Hazen Paper

Justice O'Connor, writing for the Hazen Paper Court,
made several statements that some courts and commentators
cite to show the Supreme Court's likely refusal to recognize
disparate impact claims under the ADEA.'9 ' First, she stated,

194

Id. at 24-25.
Blumrosen, supra note 173, at 79.
LABOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 12.

195

See, e.g., Allen v. Entergy Corp., 193 F.3d 1010, 1015 n.5 (8th Cir. 1999)

'
193

(concluding that Hazen Paper suggested that the ADEA does not permit disparate
impact actions); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701 (1st Cir. 1999) (asserting
that the "inescapable implication of her [Justice O'Connor's] statements [in Hazen
Paper] is that the imposition of disparate impact liability would not address the evils
Congress was attempting to purge when it enacted the ADEA"); Archer, supra note 70,
at 161-62 (suggesting that Hazen Paper casts doubt on the viability of disparate
impact claims under the ADEA); Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA
Makes: Why DisparateImpact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discriminationin

Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REv. 267, 313 (1995) (stating that "even while the Court
recognized that the plaintiff had not raised a disparate impact claim, the Court's
language shows tremendous skepticism about including a disparate impact theory
under the ADEA").

2004-05]

AGE DISCRIMINATION AND DISPARATE IMPACT

395

"Disparate treatment, thus defined, captures the essence of
what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA.". This
statement might be read to exclude disparate impact. A more
sensible interpretation, however, is that Justice O'Connor was
simply acknowledging that the essence of civil rights law is to
eradicate intentional discrimination arising from unfair
stereotypes. A secondary but nevertheless critical goal of civil
rights law, recognized in Griggs, is to eliminate the less
flagrant form of discrimination: unintentional, disparate
impact violations.
Later in Hazen Paper, Justice O'Connor remarked,
"Congress' promulgation of the ADEA was prompted by its
concern that older workers were being deprived of employment
on the basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes."1 7 She
continued, "When the employer's decision is wholly motivated
by factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate and
stigmatizing stereotypes disappears.""8 Since disparate impact
would prohibit the employer from relying on "factors other than
age," some infer that Justice O'Connor was suggesting the
inappropriateness of that theory. Although tenable, this
inference does not necessarily reflect what Justice O'Connor
meant. Interpreting these comments to preclude disparate
impact claims overlooks their context, which explicitly referred
to disparate treatment liability. Justice O'Connor was probably
noting that disparate treatment confronts the problem of
stereotyping, and the problem of stereotyping disappears when
an employment decision is based wholly on factors other than
age. Facially neutral factors causing a disproportionate impact
on older workers present a separate problem, which Justice
O'Connor was not addressing. Designed to address this
separate problem, disparate impact seeks to rid the workplace
of the consequences of discrimination, even absent stigmatizing
attitudes. One can therefore reconcile Justice O'Connor's
statements with the position that the ADEA recognizes claims
for disparate impact. Particularly in light of Justice O'Connor's
express admonition that the Court was not addressing the
viability of disparate impact under the ADEA, attempts to

196

Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).

197

Id.

198Id. at

611.
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glean hidden meanings from Hazen Paper are like grabbing at
99
fog.'
Three justices in Hazen Paper, however, did express
reservations about incorporating disparate impact claims into
the ADEA. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, stated, "there are
substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over
disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA." 9
Although the concurring opinion might lead to speculation that
the Court will ultimately reject disparate impact analysis
under the ADEA, this prediction amounts to sheer guesswork
because six judges declined to join in the concurring opinion.
D.

CongressionalInaction

The 1991 Civil Rights Act provides another
counterargument to the position that the ADEA forbids
disparate impact employment practices.2 ' That Act codified
case law that had made disparate impact unlawful under Title
VIL2"2 Although Congress simultaneously amended the ADEA
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it did not establish a claim for
disparate impact as an ADEA violation.2 "' Some take Congress'
failure to provide for such a claim as evidence of congressional
intent to exclude such claims from the ADEA." Others point
out that only congressional action reveals its intent; nothing

199Id. at

610.

200Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20 See infra note 204 and accompanying text (citing judicial and scholarly

support for this argument). See generally Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That
Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093 (1993) (providing an in-depth analysis of the
implications of congressional inaction and tying the analysis to whether changes in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 affect the ADEA).
202 The 1991 Civil Rights Act provides:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
only if-(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a)(i).
203See 42 U.S.C. § 616 (amending the notice and limitations
periods
prescribed in 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)).
2o4 See Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1996) (inferring
from Congress' failure to amend the ADEA to include claims for disparate impact that
Congress intended not to preclude such claims).
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can be deduced from what Congress does not do.2 5 Attributing
motives to what Congress does not do is too speculative to be
useful."'6
Both sides of the debate can muster support. In Johnson
v. TransportationAgency,"7 the Supreme Court explained, "The
fact that inaction may not always provide crystalline
revelation, however, should not obscure the fact that it may be
probative to varying degrees. Weber [which construed Title VII
to permit affirmative action], for instance, was a widely
publicized decision that addressed a prominent issue of public
debate. Legislative inattention thus is not a plausible
explanation for congressional inaction."0 . Like reasoning might
be applied to Congress' failure to insert disparate impact
protection into the ADEA. Congress showed that it was aware
of the importance of recognizing disparate impact theory when
it added disparate impact protection to Title VII. It similarly
demonstrated that it was mindful of the ADEA by amending it
in other ways. Therefore, its failure to include disparate impact
protection in the ADEA was a conscious decision.
Justice Scalia, however, mocked the majority's view in
Johnson, gibing that "vindication by congressional inaction is a
canard. " " He is not alone in this view. In Schneidewind v. ANR
20 Brett Ira Johnson, Note, Six of One, Half-Dozen of Another: Mullin v.
Raytheon as a Representative of Federal Circuit Courts Erroneously Distinguishingthe
ADEA from Title VII Regarding DisparateImpact Liability, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 303, 332
(2000).
20 In Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940), the Court stated:
It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence to debar this Court from re-examining its own doctrines. To explain the
cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative unrealities. Congress may not have had its attention directed to an undesirable decision; and there is no indication that as to the St.
Louis Trust cases it had, even by any bill that found its way into a committee
pigeon-hole. Congress may not have had its attention so directed for any
number of reasons that may have moved the Treasury to stay its hand....
Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy might be suggested as reasons for the inaction of the Treasury and of Congress, but they
would only be sufficient to indicate that we walk on quicksand when we try to
find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.
Id.
207 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
208 Id. at 629 n.7. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
414
n.8 (1975) (inferring that Congress intended to allow parties who did not file charges
with the EEOC to be eligible to collect backpay, because Senate approved of circuit
court rulings unanimously allowing such recovery, and because the amendment to Title
VII that Congress ultimately passed did not have such a limitation although the House
bill was to the contrary).
209 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Pipeline Co.,21 the Supreme Court refused to infer legislative
intent from Congress' failure to enact proposed legislation that
would have given the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
explicit authority to regulate the issuance of securities of
natural gas companies. 1 ' The Court instructed that it is
"generally ... reluctant to draw inferences from Congress'
failure to act." 12
Despite some reluctance, the Court has shown the
willingness to infer congressional intent from inaction when
appropriate. The unique circumstances of both amending Title
VII, a statute highly analogous to the ADEA, while amending
the ADEA in different ways, would seem to suggest the
reasonableness of inferring from congressional inaction that
Congress was at least hesitant to add disparate impact
coverage to the ADEA. Challenging this viewpoint, Brett Ira
Johnson speculates that Congress, though intending to include
disparate impact coverage in the ADEA, may not have done so
expressly because it was preoccupied with overruling Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,"3 which shifted the burden of
proving business necessity to the plaintiff in a Title VII
disparate impact case.2 4 The Court, therefore, inadvertently
overlooked the ADEA while focusing on Title VII.211 This point
is dubious, however, because the same issue of affixing the
burden of proof on the defendant would have applied to ADEA
disparate impact claims, if such claims existed. Thus, the
Wards Cove issue, rather than diverting attention from the
ADEA, would have alerted lawmakers to amend it. Johnson,
however, makes a more intriguing point. Before Hazen Paper
was decided in 1993, federal courts had uniformly applied
disparate impact analysis to the ADEA2 " The Civil Rights Act
210 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
211

Id. at 306.

212

Id.

213490

U.S. 642 (1989).

214 Johnson, supra note 205, at 333. See Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S.
at

658 ("In this phase, the employer carries the burden of producing evidence of business
justification for his employment practice. The burden of persuasion, however, remains
with the disparate impact plaintiff.").
215 Johnson, supra note 205, at
333.
216 Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 1994) (ordering
a new
trial because the district court improperly instructed the jury on a burden of proof then
applicable to a disparate impact claim); Wooden v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County,
931 F.2d 376, 379-80 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming grant of summary judgment because
the plaintiff failed to support his charge that the board's policy of limiting credit for
higher salaries at fourteen years had a disparate impact on any individual and that the
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of 1991 can be construed as tacit approval for the status quo at
that time. Johnson argues that Congress' silence therefore
indicates congressional approval of age-based disparate impact
claims." 7 This argument has a doctrinal basis. The argument
posits an example of what Professor Eskridge has called the
"acquiescence rule," which attributes congressional approval of
judicial decisions that Congress, through inaction, lets stand."8
The legal arguments discussed in this Part of the article
provide substantial support for both sides. Though both sides
score points, neither emerges the clear winner. This debate,
however, need not end in a standoff. As shown below, there are
policy arguments that weigh heavily against incorporating
disparate impact protection into the ADEA.
V.

POLICY ARGUMENTS

The ADEA protects older workers from disparate
treatment discrimination. Any victim of intentional
discrimination may seek legal and equitable relief, including
back pay, front pay, reinstatement and judgments compelling
promotion, as well as attorneys' fees."9 In cases where the
policy was unsound); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1986) (affirming
grant of summary judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff failed to prove that
discharging employees based on salary level disproportionately affected older workers);
Heward v. Western Elec., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 807, 811 (10th Cir. 1984)
(stating that a plaintiff may allege a disparate impact claim under the ADEA and
concluding that Heward alleged no such claim); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390,
1393 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of employees'
disparate impact claims based on severance policy); Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
680 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1982) (upholding the trial court's denial of plaintiffs'
motion for a directed verdict in disparate impact case brought under the ADEA); Geller
v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding jury verdict in favor of
plaintiff who alleged that a school's policy not to hire teachers with more than a certain
level of experience constituted a disparate impact violation under the ADEA).
21 Johnson, supra note 205,
at 331-33.
218

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L.

REV. 67, 71 (1988). Professor Eskridge classifies congressional inaction into three
categories:
[Tihe "acquiescence cases," in which the Court concludes that Congress's
failure to overturn a judicial or administrative interpretation is evidence that
Congress has acquiesced in that interpretation of the statute; the
"reenactment cases," where the acquiescence argument is buttressed by
reenactment of the interpreted statute without material change; and the
"rejected proposal cases," in which the Court infers from the rejection of a bill
or amendment by Congress, or by a chamber or committee of Congress, that
an interpretation similar to the rejected proposal is excluded from the
statute.
Id. at 70-71.
219 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000); 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b), (c)(1)
(2000).
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employer knew of the discriminatory practice or recklessly
permitted it to occur, the employer will have to pay liquidated
damages. 20 The question is whether, as a matter of policy, these
workers should receive additional protection afforded by
disparate impact theory.
A.

Failingto Meet the Purposesof DisparateImpact Theory

The purposes of disparate impact protection are twofold:
(1) to eliminate unjustified employment practices that cause
discrimination unintentionally, 21' and (2) to ferret out subtle
and subconscious acts of discrimination where intent is difficult
to prove.22 These two purposes will be discussed below
separately, and the author will argue that neither purpose
supports extending disparate impact protections to older
workers.
1. Eliminating Unintentional Discrimination
Disparate impact theory protects workers from
unintentional discrimination. The Supreme Court in Griggs
stated that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups and are unrelated to job capability." But older workers
do not fit the profile of a minority group impeded by "built-in
headwinds." Such workers are not a minority at all. Their
ranks have swelled to record numbers, comprising a growing
majority of the labor force. In 2003, approximately 51% of the
national labor force is over forty." ' This percentage will
increase to 53 by 2012. (See Table 1.) In January 2004, the
total labor force in the United States will be comprised of
nearly 151 million workers. (See Table 2.) Of this total
approximately 78 million workers will be over forty. By 2012
there will be about 86 million workers over forty in a labor
force of 162 million workers. (See Tables 1 and 2.)
Furthermore, older workers have not encountered systemic
220 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000). See also Hazen Paper,
507 U.S. at 617. See note 290 and accompanying text (discussing liquidated damages).
221 See infra Part V.A.1.
222 See infra Part V.A.2.
23 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
224 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Total Labor Force, available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/
pub/special.requests/ep/labor.force/clfa02l2.txt (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
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underemployment. Even in Secretary Wirtz' 1965 Labor Report
on the problems of age discrimination, he acknowledged, "Older
workers are in general valued and often prized employees.
Almost 97 percent of male workers 45 and over were employed
in 1964. Persons over 45 make up almost 40 percent of the U.S.
labor force, but only 27 percent of total unemployment .... 5
Table 1: Projections of Labor Force Over
(In thousands)

Year

Total 40+
in Labor
Force

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

77,784
79,211
80,441
81,585
82,713
83,978
85,159
85,995

40226

%40+
Making Up
Labor
Force
51.6
51.9
52.1
52.2
52.4
52.7
52.9
53.0

Table 2: Breakdown of Projections of Labor Force Over 40227
(In thousands)

Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Total in
Labor
Force
150,739
152,657
154,481
156,238
157,869
159,428
160,942
162,269

40-44

45-54

55-64

65+

19,073
18,772
18,411
18,063
17,793
17,764
17,897
17,943

34,862
35,591
36,184
36,666
37,067
37,262
37,234
37,026

19,063
19,925
20,736
21,511
22,281
23,172
24,006
24,616

4,785
4,924
5,110
5,346
5,571
5,780
6,022
6,410

The sheer magnitude of the projected number of
workers over age forty cautions that disparate impact theory
225 LABOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
2' Bureau of Labor Statistics, Total Labor Force, available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/

pub/special.requests/ep/labor.force/clfa02l2.txt (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
227 Id.
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should not be incorporated into the ADEA. More important,
older workers enjoy positions at the highest rungs of the labor
force. They fill the majority of mid-level and upper level
management positions. Twenty-five-year-olds do not run
Fortune 500 corporations. Other protected classes - AfricanAmericans, women, and the disabled - need disparate impact
protection because they have been systemically excluded from
desirable jobs. National policy seeks to bolster the
representation of these protected classes at all rungs of the
employment ladder. Disparate impact theory provides one
means to hasten the achievement of this goal. Intentional
discrimination, which sometimes targets older workers, must
be excised from the workplace, but that is as far as the legal
protection should go.
Though arising in a different context, Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc.2"8 supports the conclusion that disparate impact
protection ought not be extended to the populous class of
workers over forty. In Sutton, the Supreme Court held that the
ADA does not cover those with correctable conditions such as
visual impairments correctable with eyeglasses." In reaching
this conclusion, the Court relied on legislative history that
showed congressional intent to include approximately 43
million disabled individuals within the protected class.' ° The
number of disabled people with uncorrectable conditions
approximated this number, but the number of people with
correctable conditions totaled about 160 million."3 ' Congress did
not mean to create a protected class of disabled people that
would have exceeded half the nation's population. The reason
for congressional exclusion of those with correctable conditions
was not simply the immensity of numbers. Individuals with
correctable conditions are not powerless victims of employment
discrimination. As Justice Ginsburg explained, "the inclusion of
correctable disabilities within the ADA's domain would extend
the Act's coverage to far more than 43 million people. [Such
people] can be found in every social and economic class; they do
not cluster among the politically powerless, nor do they
coalesce as historical victims of discrimination.".2

28 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
229

Id. at 488-89.

' Id. at 484.
2131

Id. at 486-87.

2

Id. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Justice Ginsburg's reasoning counsels against extending
disparate impact protection to workers over forty. Like people
with correctable medical conditions, individuals over forty do
not comprise a powerless, victimized class. To the contrary,
they comprise the majority of the workforce, and fill the ranks
of middle and upper management. The Supreme Court in
Sutton categorically denied both disparate treatment and
disparate impact coverage to people with correctable
conditions. No one argues that workers over forty should be
denied the protection of disparate treatment theory. Sound
policy considerations, however, clash with extending disparate
impact protection to such workers.
2. Rooting Out Subconscious Discrimination
The Supreme Court has identified another purpose that
disparate impact theory serves. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust,'33 the Court observed that disparate impact analysis
ferrets out subconsciously motivated discriminatory actions too
subtle for disparate treatment analysis to detect." Clara
Watson, a teller at the bank's drive-in facility, sought several
promotions all of which, based on the subjective judgment of
branch supervisors, went to white coworkers.' The Supreme
Court heard the case to decide if subjective criteria may
provide a basis for disparate impact liability.23' Ruling that
subjective or discretionary practices, in contrast to objective
measures such as professionally designed tests, are amenable
to disparate impact analysis, "' the Court recognized that
disparate treatment law could not adequately address "the
233 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
24 Id. at 990-91. Judge

Cudahy has highlighted this point. He stated, "The
Griggs disparate impact method recognizes that not all discrimination is apparent and
overt. It is sometimes subtle and hidden. It is at times hidden even from the
decisionmaker herself, reflecting perhaps subconscious predilections and stereotypes."
EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting). See also In re Employment Discrimination Litigation Against the State of
Alabama, 198 F.3d 1305, 1321 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that "a genuine finding of
disparate impact can be highly probative of the employer's motive since a racial
'imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination'") (quoting Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977)).
235 Watson, 487 U.S.
at 982.
236 Id. at 983-85. The district court held that subjective criteria
may never
provide a basis for disparate impact liability, id. at 984, but the Fifth Circuit reversed
the holding of the district court. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the circuits were
split on the issue. Id.
237 Id. at 991.
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problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices.".38 For
example, a bank official told Watson, "the teller position [she
sought] was a big responsibility with 'a lot of money . . .for
blacks to have to count.'.'. Such remarks, the Court observed,
may not establish a disparate treatment violation, but they do
exhibit "a lingering240 form of the problem that Title VII was
enacted to combat."
Superficially, the rationale of Watson may support the
application of disparate impact analysis to age discrimination
cases: if the ADEA, like Title VII, seeks to eradicate even
subtle,
subconscious
manifestations
of discrimination,
disparate impact will assist in that enterprise. On the other
hand, a hasty application of the Watson rationale to age
discrimination may be misguided. Smoking out hidden
discriminatory racial motives is a legitimate function of
disparate impact theory. Racism has haunted this nation since
the seventeenth century, and its eradication calls for strict
measures. Age discrimination, however, does not carry the
history, animosity, pervasiveness, or lingering effects of race
discrimination. Unlike African-Americans, women, and the
disabled, all of whom have been excluded from a broad
spectrum of job opportunities, older workers enjoy high rates of
employment and often have desirable jobs. If a plaintiff cannot
prove discriminatory intent, lowering the bar by applying
disparate impact analysis will sometimes throw employers
lacking even subconscious intent into liability. Necessary in
race discrimination cases and appropriate in sex and disability
cases, this safety net approach is inadvisable under the ADEA.
An employer should not be held liable for a business decision
that one suspects might have been tainted by stereotypical
attitudes toward older workers. Disparate treatment law has
Id. at 990.
Id. (citing App. Br. at 7).
240 Watson, 487 U.S. at 990. Fort Worth Bank argued that if subjective
decisionmaking falls within disparate impact analysis, employers would institute
illegal quotas to prevent innocent statistical deviations in employment figures that
might invite disparate impact lawsuits and result in liability. Id. at 992. The Court
attempted to assuage this concern by suggesting that courts should defer, within
reasonable limits, to the subjective decisionmaking of employers, though the Court did
not define the boundaries of such deference. Id. at 999.
24' Citing Watson, the appellants in Smith argued to the Fifth Circuit that
disparate impact protection is necessary to protect older workers from subconscious
stereotypes, which are tantamount to intentional discrimination. Brief of Appellants at
11, Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-60850) (filed Dec. 20,
2002).
2'8
239
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established standards for proving discriminatory intent. If a
plaintiff in an age discrimination case cannot meet those
standards, the law should not resurrect his claim by enforcing
a less rigorous standard of liability.
B.

Frustratingthe Interests ofAfrican-Americans

The overarching policy of civil rights law is to promote
the equality of African-Americans. Title VII promotes this
policy by guaranteeing African-Americans equality of
opportunity in the workplace. Allowing disparate impact claims
under the ADEA would undermine this policy.
1. Race as a Preferred Protected Class
There is a hierarchy among the classes protected by civil
rights law. African-Americans stand at the apex of the
hierarchy because of the tenacious historical record of racism.
Aging workers endure the stigma of declining productivity,2 "2
and the disabled are burdened with "stereotypic assumptions
not truly indicative of [their] ability... " 2 Women, too, contend
with demeaning stereotypes of femininity and the proper role
of females.2' Racial prejudice, however, is more pernicious than
other stereotyping because it feeds on myths of inferiority; it
diminishes a person by telling him that no matter what he does
he can never be quite right.2 5 The psychological toll is as
See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2) (2000); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,
610 (1993) (recognizing that "[iut is the very essence of age discrimination for an older
employee to be fired because the employer believes that productivity and competence
decline with age"); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983) (summarizing the
findings of the Secretary of Labor that "stereotypes unsupported by objective fact"
accounted for most age discrimination in business and that empirical data suggest that
older workers are at least as productive as their younger counterparts).
212

243

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).

244See

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding comments
of partners at an accounting firm that a female applicant who was denied partnership
was too "macho" and that she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry," id. at
235, to be evidence of impermissible stereotyping, id. 251).
245See Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay
on Formal
Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2140-41 (1989).

Into this breach of the division-within-ourselves falls the helplessness of our
fragile humanity. Unfortunately, the degree to which it is somewhat easier in
the short run to climb out of the pit by denying the mountain labelled
.colored" than it is to tackle the sheer and risky cliff that is our scorned
mortality, is the degree to which blacks internalize the mountain labelled
colored. It is the degree to which blacks remain divided along all sorts of
categories of blackness, including class, turning the speech of helplessness
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harmful as the job interview inexplicably gone sour. But there
are more measurable harms like lack of educational
opportunities that keep good jobs out of reach. Bias against
African-Americans intrudes on their employment prospects in
nearly every quarter of the marketplace. The best jobs are the
ones that prove most elusive. Age stereotyping does not crop up
with the same persistence, nor does it evoke the feelings of
disdain that drive some employers to keep their payrolls
white.24
Civil rights law recognizes that African-Americans
occupy a special position among protected classes.247 As the
Supreme Court declared in Newman v. Piggie Park
24 eradication of racial discrimination is "a policy
Enterprises,
that Congress considered of the highest priority."249 By
abolishing slavery,"' guaranteeing a person equal protection of
the laws,"' and forbidding the denial of the right to vote on
account of race,252 the post-Civil War amendments sought to
assure basic rights for the newly freed slaves."
upon ourselves like a fire hose. We should do something with ourselves, say
the mothers to the daughters and the sons to the fathers, we should do
something. So we rub ointments on our skin and pull at our hair and wrap
our bodies in silk and gold. We remake and redo and we sing and we pray
that the ugliness will be hidden and that our beauty will shine through like
light and be accepted.
Id. at 2140-41.
246 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
313 (1976).
247 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
801 (1973) (declaring
that "it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise"); Edwards v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 855 F.2d 1345, 1352 (8th Cir. 1988)
(emphasizing the "national policy of blotting out all vestiges of racial discrimination,
especially in employment, as evidenced by both § 1981 and Title VII"). See generally
Kenneth R. Davis, Undo Hardship: An Argument for Affirmative Action as a
Mandatory Remedy in Systemic Racial DiscriminationCases, 107 DICK. L. REV. 503,
551 (hereinafter "Undo Hardship") (discussing the elevated status of AfricanAmericans as a protected class).
248

24

390 U.S. 400 (1968).
Id. at 402.

250 U.S. CONST.

amend. XIII.

251

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

252

U.S. CONST. amend. XV.

25 Congress reinforced minority rights by enacting the nineteenth century

civil rights acts, including § 1981, which guarantee black Americans contract rights in
private transactions. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). See also § 1983, which provides:
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Equal protection jurisprudence acknowledges the
heightened status of African-Americans. In McLauglin v.
Florida," the Supreme Court struck down a Florida statute
outlawing cohabitation between blacks and whites.255 While
recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment generally
requires that a legal classification meet the test of rationality,
the Court held that a classification based on race "must be
viewed in light of the historical fact that the central purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial
discrimination emanating from official sources in the States. 25'
Thus, racial classifications are "constitutionally suspect"'57 and
"subject to the 'most rigid scrutiny."'2M
Rather than strict scrutiny analysis, classifications
based on age need be supported only by a rational basis."9 In
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia," the Court
upheld a Massachusetts statute requiring the retirement of
police officers at age fifty because the statute met the rational
basis test."1 In so holding, the Court observed:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly
free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have
been discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin,
have not experienced a history of 'purposeful unequal treatment' or
been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities."

Even Secretary Wirtz' Labor Report, which was
intended to highlight the problems of age discrimination,
recognized that race discrimination is more malignant. The
Labor Report states: "Employment discrimination because of
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
25 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
255Id.
256 Id. at

191.
Id. at 192 (quoting Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
28 Id. at 192 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
259See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying
text.
1,7

260427 U.S. 307 (1976).
261 Id. at 314.
262

Id. at 313.
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race is identified, in the general understanding of it, with nonemployment resulting from feelings about people entirely
unrelated to their ability to do the job. There is no significant
discrimination of this kind so far as older workers are
concerned.""
A word of clarification is in order. Unlike this article,
which uses equal protection jurisprudence to show that
African-Americans are a preferred protected class, some
commentators analogize equal protection jurisprudence to
statutory discrimination law. 4 They believe that the special
equal protection status of African-Americans supported
extending disparate impact protection based on race - a result
achieved by Griggs. Since discrimination based on age receives
only rational basis analysis under the Equal Protection Clause,
these commentators contend that disparate impact theory
should not be incorporated into the ADEA."
Professor Kaminshine has criticized this argument. He
points out that, for purposes of equal protection, sex receives
only intermediate scrutiny, and yet disparate impact
discrimination based on sex is unlawful." Adopted after the
publication of Professor Kaminshine's article, the ADA also
includes disparate impact analysis,

age, receives only rational basis

267 though

disability, like

protection.2 "

Thus, the

263 LABOR REPORT, supra note 4,
at 2.
264 See, e.g., Pontz, supra note 195, at 310-11 (relying on Murgia to conclude

that the ADEA should not allow disparate impact claims); see generally Barbara T.
Lindemann & David D. Kadue, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 425-26
(BNA 2003) (summarizing the Equal Protection argument).
26 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
26 Kaminshine, supra note 175, at 309; see also Marla Ziegler, Note,
Disparate Impact and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REV.
1038, 1058-59 (1984) (criticizing the argument that Equal Protection analysis should
determine whether the ADEA recognizes disparate impact claims, because, unlike
Equal Protection analysis, neither Title VII nor the ADEA draws any distinctions
between the level of protection the protected classes should receive).
267 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(3)-(6) (2000).
268 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 466
(1985), the Supreme Court applied the rational basis test to a classification based on
mental disability. Declining to apply a strict scrutiny standard, the Court noted that
classifications subject to strict scrutiny analysis frequently reflect antipathy, a
circumstance not as often associated with classifications based on mental retardation.
Id. at 440. See Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1420 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
that Tulsa's disqualification of an applicant for a firefighter position based on the
applicant's disability must meet only the test of rationality under the Equal Protection
clause). But see Stephen L. Mikochik, The Constitution and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: Some First Impressions, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 619, 627 (1991) (recognizing
that Cleburne did not adopt strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny for classifications
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application of disparate impact doctrine does not depend on
equal protection analysis.269 To explain why black workers enjoy
a higher equal protection standard than older workers,
Professor Kaminshine notes that people over forty have
traditionally had more political power than African-Americans.
The ability of people over forty to protect their rights through
the political process accounts for the meager constitutional
protection they receive. They speak through legislative action.
Since the ADEA was an expression of their political power, it
should be construed broadly.27 9 This argument, however, can be
turned upside down. Kyle Barrentine argues that because
people over forty have political clout, they could have exerted
their influence to persuade Congress to pass legislation
expressly recognizing disparate impact liability in age cases.
The absence of a clear congressional enactment implies that
Congress did not recognize age-based disparate impact
liability. 71 Professor Kaminshine also rebukes the Murgia
Court for its "casual and somewhat inaccurate assessment of
age discrimination."72 Though recognizing the "unique history
and legacy of racism," he points out that age-based stereotypes
are nevertheless invidious and damaging."' He also argues that
"old age," the stage of life most associated with unfounded
stigmas, is as immutable as race."4 Except perhaps for Captain
Kirk and Mister Spock, no one can travel backward in time.
Though forceful, Professor Kaminshine's analysis does
not weaken the thesis of this article. The equal protection
argument presented in this article does not conflict with
Professor Kaminshine's rejection of equal protection analysis as
a reason to deny the availability of disparate impact claims to
older workers. Rather, the equal protection argument in this
article illustrates that race is a preferred protected class. It will
be shown in Part V(B)(2) that disparate impact protection
based on age has the unintended consequence of impairing the
based on disabilities, but maintaining that Cleburne established a standard somewhat
more rigorous than the rational basis test).
269 Kaminshine, supra note 175, at 308-09.
270 Id. at 308 (arguing that passage of the ADEA suggests congressional
recognition that older workers need special protection in the workplace).
271Kyle C. Barrentine, Note, DisparateImpact and the ADEA: A Means to an
End or Justice?, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1245, 1272-73 (1997) (reporting that people over

forty constitute a majority of registered voters).
272Kaminshine, supra note 175,
at 308.
...Id. at 307.
274

Id.
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employment prospects of African-Americans. This unintended
consequence cautions against extending disparate impact
protection to older workers. Before proceeding to that aspect of
the argument, however, this article will show that, like equal
protection jurisprudence, Title VII, Presidential executive
orders, and affirmative action policy all support the proposition
that African-Americans are a preferred protected class.
One hundred years after passage of the civil rights
amendments, the continuing denial of equal educational,
housing, and employment opportunities to African-Americans27
sparked enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, including Title
VII, which makes employment discrimination unlawful."'
Though prohibiting employment discrimination based on
religion, sex and national origin,"' Title VII erected a higher
level of protection to combat racial discrimination. For
example, § 703(e)(1) permits discriminatory employment
practices "where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification [BFOQ] necessary for the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise,"278 but the
BFOQ defense does not extend to racial discrimination. Section
623(f)(1) of the ADEA establishes a BFOQ defense to
discrimination against workers over forty. 9 Thus, in EEOC v.
Tex. Health Science Ctr.,2" the Fifth Circuit held that denying
campus guard positions to applicants over forty-five was a
BFOQ because younger guards interact more effectively with
students. A similar policy excluding black applicants from
at a predominantly white university
security guard positions
28
would violate Title VII. '
"' See 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (stating that
Congress passed Title VII "to open employment opportunities for Negroes in
occupations which have been traditionally closed to them."). By enacting the 1964 Civil
Rights Act Congress sought to remedy both economic and social injustice. See 100
CONG. REC. 7220 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark) ("The rate of Negro unemployment has
gone up consistently as compared with white unemployment for the past 15 years. This
is a social malaise and social situation which we should not tolerate."). See also
remarks of President Kennedy on proposing to Congress the bill that under the
Johnson administration would become the 1964 Civil Rights Act: "There is little value
in a Negro's obtaining the right to be admitted to hotels and restaurants if he has no
cash in his pocket and no job." 109 CONG. REC. 11159 (1963).
276 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1-e-17 (2000).
277 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
278 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
279 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
280710 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1983).
2S1 The BFOQ defense is available in sex discrimination cases. One might
therefore infer from the author's BFOQ argument that women, as a protected class, are
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Race-based affirmative action plans by federal and local
government, and the vigor with which the government has
encouraged voluntary plans in private industry shows the
sensitivity of public policy to the goal of eradicating
employment discrimination against African-Americans. The
most striking example of the federal government's support of
race-based affirmative action is President Lyndon Johnson's
Executive Order 11246, which required federal contractors to
implement affirmative action in recruiting." The Supreme
Court has also endorsed race-based affirmative action. In
United Steelworkers v. Weber,' the Court upheld Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corporation's race-based affirmative
action plan which reserved one-half of skilled-job training slots
for minorities.' The Court dismissed arguments that the plan
violated Title VII, emphasizing that the plan advanced the
national policy to eradicate racial discrimination.' "It would be
not entitled to as much protection as African-Americans. Nevertheless, women do
receive the protection of disparate impact theory. Title Vii's adoption of sex-based
disparate impact protection might seem to contradict the author's position that agebased disparate impact should be permitted. There is no contradiction, however,
because the author has raised the BFOQ argument to show that public policy affords
African-Americans a special status. As shown below, recognizing age-based disparate
impact claims will derogate this public policy by injuring the interests of AfricanAmericans. In contrast, disparate impact lawsuits instituted by women do not seriously
conflict with the interests of African-Americans. The reason for the absence of
conflicting interests is that women do not occupy a disproportionately high number of
top-tier jobs. To the contrary, many employers have systemically excluded women from
numerous categories of desirable jobs. Thus, women need disparate impact protections
more than workers over forty.
22 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965).
Section 202 of this order
provided: "The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for
employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are
treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national
origin." 30 Fed. Reg. 12,320 (Sept. 28, 1965). The executive order was amended in 1967
to include sex and religion as a protected classes. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684
(1967). The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs within the Department of
Labor issues administrative orders consistent with this executive order. One such
administrative order requires written affirmative action compliance programs for
federal contractors with fifty or more employees and who do at least $50,000 of annual
business with the federal government. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a) (1969). See generally
Martha S. West, The HistoricalRoots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 607, 612-

18 (1998) (discussing Executive Order No. 11,246 and administrative actions
implementing it).
S443 U.S. 193 (1979).

Dw Id. at 197. See generally Undo Hardship, supra note 247, at 510-12, 552

(analyzing the Weber decision and arguing that affirmative action should be a
mandatory remedy when an employer commits a systemic civil rights violation).
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979). The
Court held that, to be valid under Title VII, an affirmative action plan must meet three
requirements. First, a plan may seek minority employees only to fill jobs in categories
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ironic indeed," the Court observed, "if a law triggered by a
Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice
constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary,
private, race-conscious efforts to abolish patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy."' No one talks about age-based
Older workers do not need this
affirmative action."
extraordinary form of relief because they have not endured a
history of injustice.
Finally, racial discrimination subjects a violator to
harsher remedies than other forms of discrimination. Juries
may award compensatory and punitive damages for intentional
acts of discrimination based on religion, sex, or national

traditionally closed to them. Kaiser Aluminum's plan met this element because its
work force had a conspicuous lack of minority workers in craft-worker jobs. Id. at 19798. Next, a plan may not unnecessarily trammel the rights of white workers, by, for
example, barring them absolutely from advancement. Kaiser Aluminum's affirmative
action plan met this element because whites remained eligible for the remaining half of
the craft jobs. Id. at 208. Finally, a plan must provide for its own termination once its
goals have been achieved. Kaiser Aluminum's affirmative action plan met this
requirement by providing for its termination when the percentage of skilled craft
workers at Kaiser Aluminum approximated the percentage of blacks in the labor
market. Id.
2IId. at 204. See also H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393 ("No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the
causes and consequences of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities.
There is reason to believe, however, that national leadership provided by the
enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will
create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution to other forms of
discrimination.").
28
Gender-based affirmative action is also prevalent. In Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620-21 (1987), women were drastically
underrepresented in a number of job categories, including dispatcher. To rectify this
imbalance, the agency adopted an affirmative action plan, which permitted gender to
be considered as one factor in job promotion decisions. Johnson, a male, and Joyce, a
female, were among the twelve applicants for an open dispatcher position. Id. at 623.
At initial interviews Johnson scored seventy-five, which was the second highest score
among all applicants, whereas Joyce scored seventy-three. Id. at 623-24. After a second
interview, a board of three supervisors recommended Johnson for the job. Id. at 624.
Joyce complained to the affirmative action coordinator that the process favored male
candidates. The coordinator conveyed Joyce's feelings to Graebner, the person
responsible for making the final decision, id. at 624, and he awarded the job to Joyce.
Id. at 625. Johnson commenced a suit alleging a violation of Title VII based on sex. Id.
The agency defended by pointing to its affirmative action plan. The Supreme Court
held for the agency, ruling that the agency's affirmative action plan was consistent
with Title VII. First, the plan addressed a manifest imbalance in the number of women
employed in certain job categories, the lopsided figures showing that of 238 skilled craft
jobs women held none at all. Id. at 636. Second, the plan did not trammel the rights of
male employees because it used flexible goals, and because Johnson did not lose his
job-he merely lost the opportunity for a promotion for which he might reapply in the
future. Id. at 638. Third, the plan was temporary, stating that it sought to "attain," not
maintain, a balanced workforce. Id. at 640.
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origin,' but in all such cases, statutory caps limit damage
Similarly, statutory liquidated damages limit
awards.'
monetary awards for age discrimination to double what would
otherwise be available." The penalty for racial discrimination,
however, is unbounded by statute.
2. Adverse Effects on African-Americans
The effects of past and present discrimination manifest
themselves today in an unemployment rate over twice as high
for blacks as for whites. (See Table 3.) After the disparity
declined in the mid- to -late nineties, the gap has widened over
the past several years. (See Table 3.) Since African-Americans
are underrepresented in the workforce, disparate impact
lawsuits brought by workers over forty will benefit white
workers more than black workers. Over the years, age
discrimination cases have proliferated."' If the law recognizes
disparate impact claims for older workers, age discrimination
lawsuits will proliferate even more, particularly when cases
begin filling the calendars of circuits, including the second and
ninth, that have refused to recognize such claims. The vast
number in the protected class assures a bounty of threatened
and filed cases.

288

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2000).

2'9 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000).
290 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000). In Hazen PaperCo. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,
617 (1993), the Court held that a "willful" violation within the meaning of § 7(b)
requires that the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for whether the
discriminatory acts committed violated the ADEA.
29' See Brendan Sweeney, Comment, "Downsizing" The Age Discriminationin
Employment Act: The Availability of DisparateImpact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1527,
1527 & n.2 (1996) (citing statistics that show the burgeoning number of age
discrimination cases).
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Table 3: Unemployment Rates of Caucasians and AfricanAmericans29
Year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

White
5.7%
4.8
4.9
4.5
4.0
3.8
3.4
3.6
5.1
5.1
4.9

Black
13.1%
10.3
10.6
10.8
9.4
7.8
8.0
8.2
10.0
10.5
10.5

Another reason that litigious activity will spike is that
many of the costs of doing business correlate positively with
age. For example, salaries and fringe benefits including
insurance expenses increase as employees get older. Business
managers often base hiring and firing decisions on how most
effectively to reduce these costs. Such practices will spur older
workers, most of whom are white, to exercise their rights to
challenge practices that affect them disproportionately.
Disparate impact cases are easier to prove than
disparate treatment cases because the elusive element of intent
is not part of a disparate impact case."' Plaintiffs who simply
make a statistical showing of disproportionate impact
ordinarily defeat defendants' motions for summary judgment.'
Such cases tend to get to juries." The litigation costs and risks
of unfavorable verdicts may induce employers to discard
business practices that may invite an unhappy judicial

292 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Household Data Annual Averages, available at

ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aat3.txt (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
293 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (noting
that "[tihe factual issues and character of the evidence are inevitably somewhat
different when the plaintiff is exempted from the need to prove intentional
discrimination . . . ." and that "[t]he evidence in these 'disparate impact' cases usually
focuses on statistical disparities, rather than specific incidents, and on competing
explanations for those disparities").
See id.
See Pontz, supra note 195, at 286 (arguing that "[with the reduced burden
of proof on the plaintiff, not only are claims more likely to be successful on the merits,
but claims have an even greater chance to survive an employer's motion for summary
judgment").
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encounter. Such practices will lock whites into desirable jobs
and lock blacks out.
The RFOA defense might provide a counterweight. To
discourage a precipitous rise in age discrimination lawsuits,
courts might interpret the defense merely to require an
employer to make a showing of reasonableness, and not a
showing of business necessity, which usually entails statistical
analysis.' In Caron v. Scott Paper Co.," Judge Carter
debunked concerns that allowing disparate impact claims in
age discrimination cases would hamstring employers. He
remarked, "The ADEA allows [an] employer to defend against
claim by showing that the
an age discrimination
'differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age
.' Congress consequently carved out exemptions to limit the
statute's reach to unreasonable and unnecessary policies.""
In Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,Judge
Posner recognized the problem of requiring employers to justify
workers
older
that
affect
measures
cost-cutting
disproportionately. Faced with impending bankruptcy, TWA
prospectively capped vacation time at four weeks per year."'
The brunt of this policy fell on older workers who, because of
time served with the company, had accrued more vacation time
than the company's younger workers." Judge Posner affirmed
summary judgment for TWA, explaining, "it is impossible to
reduce the costs of fringe benefits without making deeper cuts
in the benefits of older workers, simply because, by virtue of
being older, they have greater benefits.".. 2 Though recognizing
that TWA would have had the opportunity to establish a
business necessity defense, Judge Posner explained, "Practices
so tenuously related to discrimination, so remote from the

See Player, supra note 148, at 843 (pointing out that "[elconomic efficiency
in terms of salary savings may or may not be 'reasonable,' depending one one's view of
business rationality").
297 834 F. Supp. 33 (D. Maine
1993).

Id. at 37 n.4.
967 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1992).
3o0 Id. at

1162. Before the company instituted the policy, employees with more
than sixteen years of service were entitled to more than four weeks annual vacation,
and workers with thirty years of service were entitled to seven weeks. Id.
311 Id. The policy did not breach contractual rights because it
did not nullify
accrued vacation time. Id.
312 Id. at 1164.
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objectives of civil rights law, do not reach the prima facie
threshold."3 3
The views of Judges Carter and Posner, while
encouraging, conflict with a substantial body of authority. The
EEOC, which supports extending disparate impact liability to
age-based cases, has adopted a guideline that interprets the
RFOA defense as the equivalent of the full-blown business
necessity defense, rather than as a more permissive
reasonableness defense.' To justify an employment practice as
a business necessity, the employer would ordinarily be
obligated to offer expert statistical analysis. Furthermore,
cases in jurisdictions that have already accepted disparate
impact liability in age cases do not inspire optimism. In
Camacho v. Sears Roebuck De Puerto Rico,1 Sears reduced
salaries across-the-board to lower its costs. Some of Sears' older
employees asserted that this decision had a disparate impact
on them.' Expressly rejecting Judge Posner's approach, the
court denied Sears' motion for summary judgment because
Sears had offered only a "self-serving" affidavit to support its
business justification defense." Apparently, the court wanted
303 Id. at 1165. See also Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Profl Staff Union,
53 F.3d
135, 139 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 677 (6th Cir. 1994)
(noting that "[tihe ADEA was not intended to protect older workers from the often
harsh economic realities of common business decisions and the hardship associated
with corporate reorganizations, downsizing, plant closings and relocations")). But see
Alexander, supra note 111, at 104-05 (arguing that judicial oversight of downsizing
decisions affecting older workers is necessary because most instances of corporate
downsizing decrease productivity). Kaminshine, supra note 175, at 279-85 (advocating
a balancing of the interests of the employer and employee by taking into account the
seriousness of the employer's need to reduce costs and the feasibility of less onerous
alternatives to discharge such as salary reduction of older workers); Sweeney, supra
note 291, at 1576-77 (recommending that the courts, using the business necessity
defense, strike a balance between the rights of workers over forty and the cost
justifications of employers).
304 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2003). The guideline
provides:
When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis for different treatment of employees or applicants for employment on the grounds
that it is a 'factor other than' age, and such a practice has an adverse impact
on individuals within the protected age group, it can only be justified as a
business necessity.
Id.
305 939 F. Supp. 113 (D. P.R.
1996).

" Id. at 115.
307 Id. at 123. Judge Perez-Gimenez commented:

If Judge Posner's view is that Sears should not be asked to justify its policy at
all, then his view conflicts with (1) the language of the ADEA as it has reasonably been interpreted by the executive agency charged with its enforcement, and (2) the controlling presumption in this circuit.
Id (citation omitted).
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statistical proof. The court was misguided to require Sears to
hire an expert and offer a validation study to justify its attempt
to cut expenses. Even if Sears had made such a showing on the
motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs, armed with their
own expert's analysis, could have attacked Sears' statistical
methodology and stood a good chance of creating a triable issue
of fact. A trial would have followed to decide the legitimacy of a
facially neutral, salary-reduction plan that inevitably had the
greatest impact on older workers who earn the highest wages.
A cost-savings business decision would have led to protracted
and costly litigation.
In Geller v. Markham,"' the first case recognizing agebased disparate impact claims, the Second Circuit went a step
further, categorically rejecting cost justification as a defense to
such lawsuits."' To control salary expenditures, the West
Hartford School District adopted a "sixth-step" policy, which
discouraged the recruitment of teachers with more than five
years experience. ° The school district hired Geller, a fifty-fiveyear-old teacher for an open position."' Early in the school year
the school district replaced her with a younger teacher. Geller
alleged a disparate impact claim against the school district,
proving at trial that the school district's "sixth-step" policy led
to her dismissal and replacement with a younger teacher, 1 ' and
Geller's expert witness established that the "sixth-step" policy
disqualified a disproportionately high number of teachers over
forty.' The school district argued that the "sixth-step" policy
was permissible under the ADEA because it was a cost-cutting
WS635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court denied a petition for a
writ of certiorari. 451 U.S. 945 (1981). Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the
decision denying the writ, noting that, even if disparate impact were recognized under
the ADEA, the lower courts erred in refusing to recognize cost justification as a
defense. He criticized a doctrine that would tie the hands of school boards trying to
control expenses. Id. at 948 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
309 Geler,635 F.2d at 1034.
310 Id. at 1030.

Id. at 1030.
at 1032-33.
313 Id. at 1033. The expert testified that 92.6% of teachers in Connecticut had
five or more years of teaching experience, whereas only 62% of teachers under forty
had that much teaching experience. Id. at 1032. The school board argued at trial that,
although the "sixth-step" policy seemed to correlate with age, the percentage of hires of
teachers over forty did not fall significantly after the school board adopted the "sixthstep" policy. Id. at 1033. This testimony came from a non-expert, party witness, who
offered statistics that were both uncorroborated and analytically dubious. Id. The trial
court refused to give this evidence any credence, and the Second Circuit agreed. Id. at
1033-34.
311

312 Id.
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measure designed to limit the payroll during a time of
budgetary constraints. " The Second Circuit relied on a
Department of Labor guideline, which provides:
A general assertion that the average cost of employing older workers
as a group is higher than the average cost of employing younger
workers as a group will not be recognized as a differentiation under
the terms and provisions of the Act, unless one of the other statutory
exceptions applies." 5

Ironically, the court misinterpreted this guideline,
which simply refers to the principle established in Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart.6 In Manhart, the Court
held that requiring female employees to contribute more than
males to a pension fund, based on mortality tables showing
greater longevity for women than men, violated Title VII3 In
other words, gender could not be used as a proxy for cost.
Similarly, the guideline forbids using age as a proxy for cost.31
Nevertheless, based on this guideline, the Second Circuit
categorically rejected cost-justification as a defense to a charge
of disparate impact."'
114
315

Geller, 635 F. 2d at 1034.

Id. In 1967, the Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to promulgate

rules and regulations to implement provisions of the ADEA. Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 9, 81
Stat. 602 (1974). This function was transferred to the EEOC in 1979. 92 Stat. 3781
(1978). The Department of Labor guideline continues as follows: "To classify or group
employees solely on the basis of age for the purpose of comparing costs, or for any other
purpose, necessarily rests on the assumption that the age factor alone may be used to
justify a differentiation - an assumption plainly contrary to the terms of the Act and
the purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differentials so based would serve only to
perpetuate and promote the very discrimination at which the Act is directed." 29 C.F.R.
§ 860.103(h) (1979). The EEOC adopted the substance of this guideline in a guideline of
its own, which provides: "A differentiation based on the average cost of employing older
employees as a group is unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans which
qualify for the section 4(f)(2) exception to the Act." 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f) (2004).
316 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
317 Id. at 704-06.
3' Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the Second Circuit's interpretation of the
guideline. See Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 947-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). He noted that a cost-saving measure that happens to correlate with age
does not violate the guideline. Id.
311 Geller, 635 F.2d at 1034. Accord Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe
State Coll., 702
F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the possibility of cost justification as a defense
in age-based disparate impact case where college laid off tenured professors to cut
payroll expenses). In EEOC v. Newport Mesa Unified School Dist., 893 F. Supp. 927
(C.D. Ca. 1995), Judge Taylor reached a contrary result. The school district had a
policy of hiring comparatively inexperienced teachers to avoid the higher salary levels
of more experienced teachers. Id. at 929. Judge Taylor rejected Geller's and Leftwich's
interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h), finding instead that the guideline and its
EEOC successor guideline prohibited using age as a proxy for cost. Id. at 931. He also
applied the "reasonable factor other than age" defense rather than the business
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If the Supreme Court recognizes disparate impact
liability under the ADEA, circuits that have shown hostility
toward such claims may react to cost-cutting measures as
Judge Posner did. But even if these courts more readily accept
employers' business necessity or RFOA defenses, plaintiffs still
have the fallback position of demonstrating a less
discriminative alternative. Such an alternative might be
voluntary pay cuts. Another might be job restructuring such as
the creation of part-time positions. Employers will rarely win
such cases on summary judgment. The cost of litigating and the
chance of losing to a sympathetic plaintiff who appeals to a
jury's sentiments may discourage employers from contesting
factually weak claims. Employers may find it easier to settle or
to retain older workers than to defend reasonable cost-cutting
policies.
Apart from harming business, engrafting disparate
impact into the ADEA will result in an unintended adverse
consequence on African-Americans. White workers will be
entrenched in jobs throughout the marketplace. Such a practice
will frustrate affirmative action. More broadly, AfricanAmericans will be impeded from attaining a rate of
employment equivalent to their white counterparts. The kinds
of jobs commonly held by workers over forty aggravate the
potential harm to African-Americans. The barriers to equal
employment opportunity have not come crashing down. Change
creeps forward over a period measured in decades. The most
lucrative and prestigious jobs, including supervisory and
executive positions, most stubbornly elude efforts to achieve
equal employment opportunity.32' Even today, most Africannecessity defense because not to apply the business necessity defense would be to treat
it as surplusage. Id. at 932. Cost savings seemed to Judge Taylor to be a reasonable
factor other than age. Id. at 932. Finally, although he agreed in principle that a
plaintiff might win a disparate impact case if the plaintiff showed a feasible less
discriminatory alternative, he rejected plaintiffs argument that she would have
accepted a reduced salary because such an arrangement would have violated the
relevant collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 933-34. Judge Taylor therefore
granted the school district summary judgment. Id. at 934.
320 One commentator has stated:
[Tihe numbers of Blacks that have cracked the corporate glass ceiling tells a
story less of corporate progress than corporate apartheid. There are still only
a handful of Black CEOs at the Fortune 1000 corporations. Nearly ten out of
ten senior managers are White males. Black managers make up less than ten
percent of the total managerial positions for all races and are paid on average
less than their White counterparts.
Dr. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Corporate Blind-Eye To King Holiday, at http://www.
afrocentricnews.com/html/ofariscorporate-king.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
Congress has also recognized this problem. Section 202(a)(1) of the 1991 Civil Rights
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Americans aspire more realistically to construction jobs than to
upper management positions in major corporations.
Table 4: Employed persons by occupation and race 21
(In thousands)
White
Year
Total (all civilian workers)
Management occupations
Business and financial
operations occupations
Professional and related
occupations

2002
114,013
12,920
4,516
22,883

Black
2003
114,235
12,827
4,550

2002
14,872
904
461

23,181

2,454

I

2003
14,739
859
509
2,555
I

In 2003, nearly 13% of all civilian workers were black.
Black workers, however, occupied only 7% of management
positions. (See Table 4) (showing raw employment data by
race). This comparison, understates the disparity because
blacks have a higher unemployment rate than whites.
Lawsuits initiated by workers over forty do not ordinarily
concern menial jobs. By the time a worker has reached middle
age he is probably not pumping gas or waiting on tables.
Compared to black workers, white workers hold a
disproportionately high number of positions in the middle and
top echelons of the workforce. Disparate impact lawsuits will
therefore tend to freeze African-Americans out of the most
desirable and elusive job opportunities.322 Age-based disparate
impact lawsuits will retard rather than advance racial equality
in the workplace.

Act states: "Congress finds that despite a dramatically growing presence in the
workplace, women and minorities remain underrepresented in management and
decisionmaking positions in business." Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 202(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1081
(1991).
321 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Household Data Annual Averages, available
at
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaatl2.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2005).
322 See
Alfred Blumrosen, Federal Statutory Law

of Employment
Discrimination, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 186, 192-93 (1981) (book review). Blumrosen
has commented, "[Tihe prime beneficiaries of the ADEA are white males in their fifties
and sixties. They are also the beneficiaries of traditional discrimination against
minorities and women. To give them the benefit of the Griggs principle will inevitably
slow the process of affirmative action for minorities and women." Id.
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CONCLUSION

In Smith v. City of Jackson,"' the Supreme Court will
decide whether age-discrimination plaintiffs may sue for
disparate impact discrimination. Proponents of providing
disparate impact protection under the ADEA argue that the
congruence between the prohibitory sections of Title VII and
the ADEA supports their position. Opponents point out that
while Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, amended Title
VII to include disparate impact coverage, it declined to insert a
similar amendment into the ADEA. They also rely on
legislative history in the form of the Department of Labor
Report submitted to Congress, but the Labor Report merely
muddles the issue. A third argument of opponents - supposed
indications in the language of Hazen Paper - relies on
ambiguities. Most commentators have concentrated on the
RFOA defense contained in § 623(f)(1) of the ADEA, but
analysis of this provision has not proven any more helpful.
Despite several tenable interpretations of this defense, the
most persuasive interpretation - that the RFOA defense
applies to disparate treatment rather than disparate impact sheds little if any light. One can pick from a grab bag of
arguments.
Some employers believe that a sixtieth birthday
forecasts declining energy, competence, and productivity. They
junk older workers like worn out pieces of machinery. This is
why older workers need the protection of civil rights law - to
rid the workplace of intentional discrimination bred by
unfounded stereotypes. Disparate treatment law provides
precisely the right instrument to achieve this goal. But not all
of the remedial approaches of civil rights law are appropriate
for this problem. Affirmative action, for example, though
necessary to fight racial discrimination, has no place in
addressing age discrimination. The same is true of disparate
impact theory. It is the wrong means to protect the interests of
older workers because they are amply represented even at the
highest levels of employment. No one should worry that facially
neutral practices are excluding older workers from prominent
jobs. Some are beguiled by a flawed syllogism: Older workers
comprise a protected class; disparate impact theory applies to
23 351

F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted,72 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 29,

2004) (No. 03-1160).
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all other classes protected by civil rights law; therefore
disparate impact law should protect older workers. It is a feelgood argument: Let's provide older workers with as many
rights as other protected classes. But a reflexive extension of
rights should not direct public policy. One should look deeper
into the implications of such a decision.
African-Americans have survived a history of denial and
exclusion. Of all the classes protected by civil rights law, the
class of African-Americans has deservedly received the highest
level of protection. It is regrettable that this policy has not
translated into corporate
practice. Even today, the
unemployment rate of African-Americans is twice that of
whites," and many employers balk at placing even the most
qualified black
workers
in positions
of significant
responsibility. Forty years after enactment of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, stereotypes of black laziness and ineptitude lurk in
the corners of the workplace. Workers over forty comprise more
than half of the labor force, but African-Americans, because of
their high unemployment rate, are underrepresented in this
immense and growing protected class. They are therefore not
proportional beneficiaries of disparate impact lawsuits.
Because blacks are underrepresented in management
positions, they will not participate fully in typical age
discrimination lawsuits in which lucrative, mid- and high-level
management positions are at stake. If the ADEA provides
disparate impact protection to older workers, an unintended
but inevitable consequence will be that African-Americans will
be excluded from desirable jobs that business has traditionally
reserved for whites. Policymakers must reject this tradeoff.
African-Americans should not have to ride a seesaw of civil
rights.

3U See supra note 292 and Table 3 (showing unemployment statistics for
blacks and whites).

